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Woe unto you, lawyers! for ye have taken away the key of knowl-
edge ....
- Luke 11:52
Woe unto you, ye blind guides. . . .Woe unto you, scribes and
Pharisees. . .! for ye. . . have neglected the weightier matters
of the law, justice and mercy and faith ....
- Matthew 23:16, 23
INTRODUCTION
It is widely regarded as "good" or "right" that sellers of
products should be "strictly" liable for injuries caused by product
defects.' Such strict liability is broader than negligence, 2 but nar-
rower than "absolute" liability.3 Among the doctrines narrowing
this liability is the requirement that the injury be caused by an
unreasonably dangerous, defective condition.' Thus, the scope of
strict liability is determined in part by the definition of such a
condition.
This article will consider this concept of "unreasonably
dangerous product defect" from a jurisprudential perspective.
1. This view has been adopted by: (1) courts, see 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A[3], at 3-248 n.2 (1975); 1 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW
OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4.41 (2d ed. 1974); Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057 § 4 (1967); [1974]
PROD. LtAB. REP. CCH 4060; (2) legislatures, see, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-318.a
(Supp. 1975); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 105-106 (1968); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 66-371 to -373 (Cum.
Supp. 1975); and (3) commentators, see, e.g., W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 98 (4th ed.
1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
2. For example, the exercise of "due care" by the defendant is irrelevant. E.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Toms § 402A(2) (a) (1965). Similarly due care or reasonableness
on the part of the plaintiff is irrelevant insofar as discovering a defect is concerned. Id.
Comment n.
3. Liability would be viewed as absolute if the seller were liable whenever the product
was a "cause" of injury in the sense that "but for" the product, there would have been no
injury. However, such absolute liability is not imposed for product-related injury. See,
e.g., Helene Curtis, Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 849 (5th Cir. 1967); Calabresi & Hirschoff,
Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1056 (1972); Fischer,
Products Liability - The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339, 340 (1974).
4. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965) (the entire section is
quoted in note 41 infra); but see, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501
P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972) (plaintiff need show only that product "defective").
[Vol. 28
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UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS PRODUCT DEFECT
Such analysis differs from conventional doctrinal discussion in
two respects. First, jurisprudential analysis is broader and more
general. 5 From this broader perspective, the concept of "un-
reasonably dangerous defect" is viewed in terms of its relation
not only to products liability but also to torts generally and to the
entire legal system. Second, jurisprudence is not necessarily con-
cerned with proposing a concrete solution to a particular doc-
trinal problem. Rather, a primary task of jurisprudence is to pro-
vide a general analytical framework for organizing and evaluating
specific doctrinal proposals.'
The focus of this article is upon the construction of such a
framework. Part I develops a jurisprudential approach for viewing
"doctrine" from a social perspective and for evaluating proposals
concerning what the concept of doctrine "ought" to be. The use
of this framework is illustrated in Part II by considering two tests
for the "proper" identification of unreasonably dangerous de-
fects: the "cost-benefit" test and the "reasonable consumer ex-
pectation" test. Since this discussion is primarily illustrative,
consideration of other possible tests of liability for product-
related injury is limited. Part III utilizes the jurisprudential
framework to demonstrate that, while useful in the judicial deci-
sionmaking process, existing proposals concerning what product-
liability doctrine "ought" to be (including proposals other than
efficiency or consumer expectation) are deficient in that they
omit considerations of substantive justice involved in this pro-
cess. The jurisprudential framework proposed in this article also
omits substantive considerations; this weakness is addressed in
several short, tentative observations concerning justice and meta-
physics.
The textual development, illustration, and evaluation of the
proposal are brief, thus helping emphasize the framework's basic
structure. This has necessitated an unusually extensive use of
textual footnotes. The reader, therefore, should anticipate that
5. See, e.g., J. HALL, FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE 11-17 (1973).
6. See, e.g., Hart, Analytical Jurisprudence in Mid-Twentieth Century, A Reply to
Professor Bodenheimer, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 953 (1957); Pannam, Professor Hart and Ana-
lytical Jurisprudence, 16 J. LEGAL ED. 379 (1964); Summers, The New Analytical Jurists,
41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 861 (1966); cf., e.g., A. KAPLAN, THE NEW WORLD OF PHILOSOPHY 53-93
(1961). Kaplan notes that:
[A]nalytic philosophy focuses on the task of formulating the conditions
which a statement must satisfy in order to convey knowledge, and developing
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reference to some footnotes may be essential to a more complete
understanding of the text. Conciseness and clarity are also facili-
tated by the use of symbols.
I. A JURISPRUDENTIAL PERSPECTIVE ON DOCTRINE
A. Doctrine Within the Broader Social and Legal Context
That man's environment is characterized by a scarcity of
necessary resources is a truism with enormous impact on the
structure of social systems.7 Every society must have some
method of distributing these scarce goods so that at any one time
a particular person may exclude all others from a particular re-
source.' Such a distribution is often referred to as the granting or
recognition of a "right" or of an "entitlement." 9 If these entitle-
ments/rights are viewed as an exclusionary "boundary" around a
person or thing, 0 then the concept of "duty" or "obligation" can
be regarded as a requirement not to cross a boundary without
"tconsent.""1
Another truism concerning social life is that boundary cross-
7. Not all resources are characterized by scarcity. For example, cultural resources
such as concepts, songs, or alphabets are not depleted no matter how many people use
them. See, e.g., J. LUCAS, TiE PIiNCIPLES OF POLMCS § 44 at 184 (1966). Indeed, quite the
opposite is often true - for example, the greater the number of people using a particular
alphabet, the more useful that alphabet becomes. Nevertheless, certain crucial physical
resources like air, water, land, energy, and labor are scarce. See, e.g., id. at 183-84; P.
SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 17-19 (9th ed. 1973). Moreover, it could be said that we have a
scarcity of new, improved cultural resources.
8. See, e.g., H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 89, 167, 192 (1961); Calabresi & Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv.
L. REv. 1089, 1090-91 (1972); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. Rrv. 1165, 1206-13
(1967); cf., e.g., ECONoMIc FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW, 1-50 (B. Ackerman ed. 1975).
9. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 1, Comment b (1965) ("right"); Cala-
bresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1090 (1972) ("entitlement"). This distribution need not
be directed by any official agent who "grants" rights to society but may evolve gradually
as members of the society come to recognize rights. See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF
LmERTY 8-12, 17-24 (1975); L. MAre, PiumTvE GovERNMENT 35-60 (1970); cf. note 26 and
accompanying text infra.
10. See, e.g., R. NoziCK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UToPIA 57 (1974).
11. See, e.g., Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 16 (1913). For a discussion of Hohfeld's system, see note 23 infra.
The possible limits on the granting of consent are not considered herein. This topic is
developed briefly in Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1092-93 (1972); cf., e.g., G.
CALABFSEI, THE COSTS OF AccmENTs 55-64 (1970). Analysis of these limits in terms of
products liability would be particularly relevant in a doctrinal system which determined
rights and duties in terms of communications between sellers and buyers. For a discussion
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ings do occur."2 Societies, therefore, must respond in some way.
There are several possibilities: 3
(1) Prohibit the crossing or conduct likely to result in the
crossing." Where the prohibition is disobeyed or likely to be
disobeyed, there are a number of approaches available to the
legal system: punishment, 5 restraint," treatment, 7 or author-
of the latter approach, see notes 85, 94 and accompanying text infra. Concepts of implied
consent would be relevant in both negligence and strict liability frameworks for determin-
ing liability for product- "caused" injury. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Tomls §§
496A-496G (assumption-of risk as a defense in negligence), § 402A, Comment n (1965)
(assumption of risk as a defense in strict liability).
12. Although the likelihood of these crossings is reduced by coercive enforcement of
duties, see, e.g., H. HART, supra note 8, at 191, 193-94, some prohibited crossings will occur
even with such coercion. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF AccIDENTs 194 (1970).
13. Possible responses in addition to those in the text include: (1) regulate or prohibit
except where the potential border crosser satisfies certain requirements - e.g., passing a
license test, bond to compensate injured (See notes 145, 147 infra and accompanying text);
(2) discourage - e.g., tax activity heavily (note that taxes may or may not be used to
compensate); and (3) provide "better" alternatives - e.g., improved employment oppor-
tunities or welfare programs to "prevent" theft.
14. Three points should be made concerning prohibition. First, prohibition should
include two subcategories - (1) with compensation and (2) without compensation. This
distinction is required because forbidding X to cross Y's boundary necessarily restricts X's
activities, see, e.g., J. LucAS, supra note 7, at § § 42 & 43, and X is sometimes compensated
for these restrictions. E.g., Spur Industries Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., 108
Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972) (cattle feedlot enjoined as nuisance, but plaintiff required
to compensate owner of feedlot for this restriction). For discussions of the problems in-
volved in determining when such compensation is required, see, e.g., R. NozicK, supra
note 10, at 78-79, 81-84, 86-87, 114-115, 142-147; Michelman, supra note 8. Second, prohi-
bition is often imposed where no unconsented boundary crossings are involved. Some of
the problems involved in justifying such a prohibition are discussed in note 80 infra. Third,
reasons for excusing or justifying border crossings, see, e.g., H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPoNsIBILiTY 28-53 (1968), are considered as part of the response.
15. Punishment is defined in various ways. H.L.A. Hart's approach in PUNISHMENT
AND REsPoNsiBLrrY, supra note 14, is adopted in this article:
I shall define the standard or central case of "punishment" in terms of five
elements:
(i) It must involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleas-
ant.
(ii) It must be for an offence against legal rules.
(iii) It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his offence.
(iv) It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the
offender.
(v) It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a
legal system against which the offence is committed.
Id. at 4-5. For comparisons of the two basic approaches to justifying punishment, retribu-
tion and deterrence, see, e.g., id. at 6-13; R. NozICK, supra note 10, at 59-63 (1975). For a
discussion of other possible principles of punishment, see, e.g., CamINAL LAw 222-238 (G.
Dix and M. Sharlot eds. 1973). The use of punishment (punitive damages) in products
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ized self-help."9
(2) Allow the crossing but require compensation.'9 There are a
number of ways of determining when compensation will be re-
quired: strict liability,2" negligence, 2' or a variety of other possi-
ble standards.
liability cases is discussed in, e.g., Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Litigation, 76 MIcH. L. REv. 1257 (1976).
16. Restraint - for example, by imprisonment or by quarantine - differs from
punishment in that:
(1) It does not involve pain or other consequences normally considered un-
pleasant.
(2) It is sometimes imposed even where there has been no offence.
See note 15 supra. The justification for restraint is the prevention of a nonconsensual
boundary crossing and/or of irrational behavior. See note 85 infra.
17. A "treatment perspective" views border crossings without consent (or irrational
acts, or behavior indicating a strong likelihood of either) as manifestations of an illness
that can be cured. Treatment may involve restraint - for example, by commitment to a
mental institution - but it might also consist of therapy imposed outside institutions.
Treatment differs from punishment in that:
(1) Pain or other unpleasant consequences are not necessarily involved. Their
use is only incidental to "curing" the illness.
(2) There need not be an offense against the legal rules.
See note 15 supra. For discussion of consensual crossings, see note 85 infra.
18. Examples of self-help include self defense and the forceful recapture of chattels.
See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at §§ 19, 22.
19. Several points should be made concerning compensation. First, although the
payment of compensation can be unpleasant, this is merely incidental because the focus
is on correcting the harm caused by the crossing. Indeed, compensation need not come
from the person crossing the boundary. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS,
supra note 11, at 22-23. Compensation is thus different from prohibition. See note 15
supra. Second, although compensation is usually made after the border crossing, this
delay is not necessary if it is possible to determine, within some given parameters of
reliability, the probability of a border crossing. Approaches to such precrossing compensa-
tion are discussed in APPENDIX 1. Third, although restitution could be used in many
cases (for example, where property which was taken without consent), the focus herein is
on crossings where restitution is inappropriate and damages (or replacement) is the only
possible remedy - for example, property is destroyed without consent.
20. See notes 2 & 3 and accompanying text supra.
21. This approach can be subcategorized in terms of whether liability depends upon
the negligence of
(1) the person who crossed the border, see, e.g., United States v. Carroll Tow-
ing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947); and/or
(2) the person whose border was crossed. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § § 463-496 (1965) (contributory negligence); Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra
note 3, at 1058-59 ("reverse negligence").
The difficulties in framing any test for negligence are discussed in notes 50-52, 55-89,
102, 115-38 and accompanying text infra.
22. Examples include intent, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965), and
recklessness, id. at § 282, Comment e, §§ 500-503 at one extreme, and absolute liability,
see note 3 supra, at the other.
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(3) Do nothing about the crossing.23
Response decisions, like entitlement decisions, have distribu-
tional consequences. For example, if X is granted the entitlement
to property, he becomes richer than he would be if the entitle-
ment were denied. Moreover, he is richer if the legal system re-
sponds by requiring compensation or by prohibiting rather than
The following list of fact situations indicates the variety of potential doctrinal results
based on this subcategorization:
I. D (person who crossed border) negligent, V (person whose border is crossed)
negligent. Depending on the particular negligence doctrine applied, there are
several possible results:
A. Negligence:
(1) with contributory negligence, V bears loss;
(2) without contributory negligence, D bears loss; or
(3) with comparative negligence, D and V bear loss.
B. "Reverse Negligence" (see Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 3):
(1) with reverse contributory negligence, D bears loss;
(2) without reverse contributory negligence, V bears loss; or
(3) with comparative negligence, D and V bear loss.
H. D negligent, V not negligent - D bears loss.
I. D not negligent, V negligent - V bears loss.
IV. D not negligent, V not negligent. Depending on the particular negligence
doctrine applied there are two possible results.
A. Negligence - V bears loss.
B. "Reverse Negligence" - D bears loss.
23. Although a legal system can be said to "do nothing" if it prohibits a crossing but
does not enforce the prohibition, this is not the sense in which "do nothing" is used in
the text. The framework presented in the text is formal, not empirical, in that "doing
nothing" is distinguished in reference to prohibition and compensation. This formal struc-
ture can be illustrated by considering a particular entitlement:
Entitlement: A is entitled to this book.
Duty: A's entitlement establishes a border around the book which others can-
not cross by possessing, using, or harming book.
Response: Some possible responses to crossings are:
(1) Prohibit: If a person crosses "intentionally," then he is punished by
the legal system.
(2) Allow with compensation: If person crosses intentionally or negli-
gently, then the legal system will require him to compensate.
(3) Do nothing: If a person crosses with due care, then the legal system
will do nothing.
See notes 14 & 19 supra. Entitlements/rights are sometimes defined in terms of responses.
For example, Hohfeld viewed the third response in the example above as a denial of an
entitlement to A - i.e., A had a "no-right" to book where injury done with due care.
Hohfeld, supra note 11. This article distinguishes between granting the entitlement and
responding to crossings of the border established by the entitlement because "doing noth-
ing" is not the same thing as denying an entitlement. The entitlement might still be
respected by members of society even if there is no legal response. See, e.g., H. HAirr,
supra note 8, at 55-57, 80-88, 96, 134-37; Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1090-91
n.4.
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by doing nothing.24 Similarly, because a negligence system allows
others to cross his boundary so long as they use due care, he is
richer if the system's theory of response is strict liability rather
than negligence. 5
A third truism concerning societies is that complex interde-
pendent societies cannot rely entirely on custom and self-help to
establish and enforce entitlement boundaries. Instead, a consid-
erable portion of these tasks must be accomplished by "officials"
who are "recognized" as having certain powers to grant entitle-
ments, to define the conditions which constitute border crossings
without consent, and to respond to such crossings.26 Conse-
quently, in "modern" societies many basic distributive decisions
are made by officials. Viewed from this broad social perspective,
entitlement doctrine consists of the patterns of specific decisions
of officials granting and enforcing rights/entitlements.
B. Jurisprudential Criteria for Evaluation of Normative
Doctrine
Doctrine may be viewed from a number of overlapping, but
nonetheless distinct, perspectives. For example, it can be said
that:
(1) Doctrine is what officials do about conflicts over scarce
goods.Y
24. At the same time, however, the person holding the entitlement is richer to the
extent that he crosses the border of others holding the same type of entitlement because
it is cheaper for him to cross such borders where the system responds by doing nothing.
This complication reinforces rather than negates the textual point that the determination
of response has distributional implications.
25. Because of the distributional consequences of selecting a particular response, it
is difficult, if not impossible, to analyze torts solely in terms of retributive or corrective
justice. An example of an attempt to exclude all distributional considerations from tort
doctrine is provided in a series of three articles by Richard Epstein. Epstein, A Theory of
Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STun. 151 (1973); Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in
a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974); Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4
J. LEGAL STUD. 391 (1975).
26. See, e.g., H. HART, supra note 8, at 77-120; Hubbard, "One Man's Theory...
A Metatheoretical Analysis of H.L.A. Hart's MODEL OF LAw, 36 MD. L. Rsv. 39 (1976);
ef., e.g., J. BucHANAN, supra note 9, at 12-13, 64-73; T. HOBBES, LEviATHAN (1651); R.
NOZICK, supra note 10, at 3-146.
27. This definition of law is characteristic of "legal realists." See, e.g., Rumble, Law
as the Effective Decision of Officials: A "New Look" at Legal Realism, 20 J. PUB. L. 215
(1971). An example of "legal realism" is Walter Wheeler Cook's assertion that:
"Right," "duty," and other names for relations are not. . . names of objects or
entities which have an existence apart from the behavior of the officials in
question, but merely terms by means of which we describe to each other what
[Vol. 28
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(2) Doctrine is established by an official rule which governs
conflicts over scarce goods.2
(3) Doctrine is what ought to be reflected in officials' actions
and/or in a rule. 9 There are two types of such normative doc-
trine:
prophecies we make as to the probable occurrence of events - the behavior of
the officials.
Cook, Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L. J. 457, 476 (1934)
(emphasis added). This approach is also characteristic of many legal sociologists. See, e.g.,
D. Black, The Boundaries of Legal Sociology, quoted in THE SOCIAL ORGAIZATION OF LAW
41 (D. Black & M. Mileski eds. 1973) (Legal sociology is concerned with patterns in "the
observable dispositions of judges, policemen, prosecutors, or administrative officials." Id.
at 46).
28. This perspective is characteristic of "legal positivism." For a short, critical dis-
cussion of positivism, see, e.g., Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14
(1967). This article accepts Dworkin's conceptual distinctions between rules, principles
and policies:
Rule: A rule determines the result of a case if it applies.
Principle: A principle may apply to a case but not determine its result. A
principle, therefore, has a dimension of "weight" which a rule does not. An
example of a principle is: "no man may profit from his own wrongdoing" (appl-
icable but not determinative, for example, in cases of adverse possession).
Policy: A goal or ultimate aim of a particular area of the law - e.g., prevention
of accidents. Principles are applicable to various areas.
See id. at 22-29; Dworldn, Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1057 (1975). However, this use
of these three concepts does not involve a commitment to Dworkin's position that princi-
ples dictate one and only one proper decision in a particular case. See Dworkin, Hard
Cases, supra; Note, Dworkin's Rights Thesis, 74 MICH. L. Rxv. 1167 (1976).
29. This perspective includes "natural law" assertions that official action and rules
can be evaluated in terms of a higher, absolute law, which is innate in the nature of man
and the world. Where acts/rules conflict with this "natural law," the modem "natural
law" response varies along a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum, where the conflict is
minimal, conflicting acts/rules are viewed as bad or ill-advised but still "law" in the sense
that a citizen ought to obey them. At the other end of the spectrum, the conflict is so
severe that the citizen has no obligation to obey. Rather there may be an obligation to
disobey. See, e.g., L. FULER, THE MoRAirry OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969); H. HART, supra note
8, at 195-207; J. LucAs, supra note 7, at §§ 73-74; J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE §§ 51-
59 (1971).
This perspective also includes more modest views - for example, policy orientations
which evaluate existing rules and actions in such terms as "if you want to accomplish X,
then Y is the rule/action which ought to be adopted." The distinction between the natural
law and the policy orientations is illustrated in the discussion in note 33 infra. The effects
of the refusal by policy analysts to address the determination and evaluation of X are
discussed in text accompanying notes 115-22 infra.
Since any empirical pattern of entitlement decisions will reflect a particular approach
of how entitlements ought to be allocated and enforced, it can be said that every legal
system is based, at least implicitly, on a set of criteria for designating certain persons as
more worthy of entitlements and certain responses to border crossings as "better" than
others. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8. The textual discussion, however, is
directed to explicit ideal perceptions of what doctrine ought to be.
9
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(a) Substantive. A variety of proposals have been offered
for determining
1) which persons should be granted entitlements,10
and/or
2) which responses should be used in a given situa-
tion.'
(b) Formal. Regardless of the substantive decisions made
by the legal system, various formal requirements, such as
the following, often are proposed for evaluating doctrine:"
1) A legal system should "treat like cases alike.
3
30. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, supra note 29.
31. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, T HE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
32. See, e.g., L. FULLER, supra note 29; J. RAWLS, supra note 29, at § 38. For a general
discussion of the nature and limits of formal theories, see notes 33 & 34 infra.
33. This particular proposal illustrates several points concerning the "ought"
perspective on law:
(1) The necessity to treat like cases alike can be viewed as good either: (a) in
itself because of some higher, natural law, see, e.g., L. FULLER, supra note 29 at
46-49, 200-24; J. LucAs, supra note 7, at §§ 27 & 28; J. RAWLS, supra note 29, at
§ 38 at 237-38; cf. I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 67-68,
83-84 (H. Paton trans. 1958); or (b) because it is instrumental or efficient in the
accomplishment of some given goal or policy. See, e.g., H. HART, supra note 8,
at 88-89, 191, 195-97. Further discussion of these two perspectives is contained
in note 29 supra.
(2) Formal requirements of justice are limited for a number of reasons:
(a) Their impact often depends on prior substantive decisions. See, e.g.,
F. NORTHROP, THE COMPLEXITY OF LEGAL AND ETHICAL EXPERIENCE 47
(1959); Lyons, On Formal Justice, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 833 (1973). "Treat
like cases alike," for example, requires some stipulation of the proper
substantive criterion(a) of likeness. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, PoLMCS BK III,
Ch. 12, (E. Barker trans. 1948); H. HART, supra note 8, at 155; J. LUCAS,
supra note 7, at § 56, at 244; cf., e.g., Miller & Howell, The Myth of
Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 661 (1960);
M. Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Adjudication: Of
Politics and Neutral Principles, 31 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 587 (1963); B.
Wright, The Supreme Court Cannot be Neutral, 40 TEx. L. REv. 599
(1962). Nevertheless, the precept is not meaningless if it forces decision-
makers to "justify" a particular classification. See, e.g., J. RAwLs, supra
note 29, at § 38, at 237-38; see also notes 36 & 120 and accompanying text
infra.
(b) In many cases a particular formal requirement may conflict with:
(i) Another formal requirement. For example, if two lower courts
rule differently on the same issue, then a higher court in resolving
the issue must either treat like cases unlike by allowing both con-
flicting decisions to stand or indulge in something akin to retroac-
tive legislation by reversing at least one of the decisions. Cf., e.g.,
L. FULLER, supra note 29, at 46-49, 51.
(ii) A substantive requirement. For example, stare decisis, which
is a temporal form of treating like cases alike, will often conflict
with the need to adopt a better criterion of likeness by overruling
[Vol. 28
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2) An individual entitlement decision should be 3.131
made by an impartial judicial tribunal.34
The allocation of product-caused losses between sellers and
consumers presents issues concerning the establishment and en-
forcement of boundaries. One pattern or "doctrine" in the resolu-
tion of these issues is a concern with the question: "What is an
unreasonably dangerous product defect (hereinafter UDPD)?" As
a result, each of the broad perspectives on doctrine set forth above
is paralleled by a more particular statement concerning UDPD:
(1) UDPD is what a court says it is.
(2) UDPD is what a rule, e.g, section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, says it is.
(3) UDPD is what a normative test says it "ought" to be.
This article will focus on the last view of UDPD by examining two
theories of how UDPD ought to be defined. Thus, tasks such as
cataloguing and reconciling cases as well as predicting judicial
decisions are omitted. Similarly, there is little analysis of existing
rules.
The discussion of these tests focuses on the extent to which
each test satisfies two formal jurisprudential criteria for apprais-
ing any "ought"-oriented doctrinal test:
(1) The test should be as clear and unambiguous as possible."
precedent. See, e.g., R. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JusncF 39-53
(1969).
(c) As indicated in note 34 and accompanying text infra, formal models
are often directed toward particular officials and the impact of a formal
requirement is often dictated by the particular official involved. For ex-
ample, although legislatures can be viewed as limited by the requirement
of treating like cases alike, see, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No
bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed."); id. amend. XIV,
it is generally conceded that legislatures are not as limited as courts in
treating like cases unlike-for example, by enacting radically different
statutes. See, e.g., J. LUCAS, supra note 7, at §§ 25, 50-51.
34. See, e.g., J. LUCAS, supra note 7, at §§ 20, 24, 25, 28; J. RAWLS, supra note 29, at
238-39; cf., e.g., H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, PoLIrIcs AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1961); J.
RAWLS, supra at 30-32, 83-90. This type of formal justice proposal is often referred to as
procedural justice, see, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 29, at § 14, § 31 at 197, §§ 36-38; R. UNGER,
LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 195-96 (1976), or as a "process" model of justice, see, e.g., F.
NORTHROP, supra note 33, at 45-46. Process or procedural justice proposals are subject to
the limits set out in note 33 supra. The parallel weaknesses are apparent if one rephrases
the textual requirement of "an imparital tribunal" as "a tribunal which treats 'like cases
alike."' For further discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of such models, see notes
115-22 and accompanying text infra.
35. See, e.g., N. BowIE, ToWARDS A NEW THEORY OFDIsTrimurVE JUSTICE 15-16 (1971);
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(2) The test should be "justified" as superior to other avail-
able tests in terms of some criteria other than the ad hoc, subjec-
tive preferences of the proponent of the test.",
L. FULLER, supra note 29, at 63-65; W. QUINE & J. ULLIAN, THE WEB OF BELIEF 65-66 (1970).
No test or rule can be completely certain or precise because of the limits of language and
the limits of man's ability to determine existing conditions and to predict future condi-
tions. See, e.g., AmsToTLE, NicOMACHEAN ETHIcs BK. V, Ch. 9; H. HART, supra note 8, at
121-26; PLATO, STATESMAN 294. Attempts to go beyond these limits are subject to the
criticism of risking artificial rigidity and precision by attempting to articulate what cannot
be articulated. See, e.g., Christie, Vagueness and Legal Language, 48 MINN. L. REv. 885
(1964). The first criterion states only that ambiguity is undesirable and should, therefore,
be avoided to as great an extent as possible, and this statement explicitly recognizes that
some vagueness is unavoidable.
36. See, e.g., J. LucAs, supra note 7, at § 27. Lucas argues that evaluative statements
should be "universal." For example,
A man who claims that a particular picture is a goodpicture, but allows
that another picture might be like it in every respect, except that it was not
good, shows thereby that he has not been reasoning rationally, and that his
putative value-judgment 'This is a good picture' is not a value-judgment, be-
cause not a judgment at all.
The picture enthusiast was proved irrational. . . because he was prepared
to deny that another picture was good although he did not allow that there was
any respect in which it differed from the picture that, he maintained, was good.
Id. at 127-29. Similarly, it is irrational to assert that a particular "ought"-oriented doc-
trine is better than another without justifying that conclusion by pointing out how the
preferred doctrine is better.
Three qualifications concerning "justification" are in order. First, since justification
can be viewed in terms of Lucas's concept of universalisability, it should be noted that:
The sense in which rationally arrived at conclusions must be universalisable
has raised many difficulties. One, which is important for our present purpose,
is whether the universalisability is a practical universalisability, such that the
speaker should be able, on demand, to universalise his conclusion, stating ex-
actly and completely what the relevant universal characteristics are; or whether
the universalisability is only in principle, so that if there were a case exactly the
same in all relevant (but unstated) respects, then the same conclusion would
follow. The requirement of universalisability in the former sense is a more strin-
gent one. It requires that the speaker should be able to specify an infima species
all the instances of which are qualitatively identical so far as the argument is
concerned, and therefore with the some'[sic] conclusion holding of them all.
The latter sense requires only that if different conclusions hold in two cases,
there must be some relevant difference between the cases to account for the
discrepancy.
Id. at 128. The criterion of justification employed in this article is based on the latter,
weaker sense of universalisability. Second, the specification of relevant characteristics is
the equivalent of the subjective stipulation of substantive criteria of "likeness" involved
in distinguishing like and unlike cases. See note 33 supra. Thus, subjective preference
eventually becomes involved, but at a higher level than the doctrinal level. Cf., e.g., J.
RAWLS, supra note 29, at 46-53; Feinberg, Rawls and Intuitionism, READING RAWLS 108 (N.
Daniels ed. 1974); Hare, Rawls' Theory of Justice (pts. 1-2), 23 PnmosopmcAL Q. 144, 241
(1973). Third, the requirement is formal in that it does not prescribe any proper criteria
of justification. It only requires that some justification be given.
[Vol. 28
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These particular standards are employed for two reasons. First,
the criteria are likely to be accepted by most persons constructing
models of what doctrine ought to be. Second, to the extent that
a normative model of proper doctrine is designed to direct
decision-oriented inquiry, both tests are functional: they require
not only that the model be specific about the conduct of the
inquiry but also that it indicate why the particular directions are
"important."
Although other formal criteria might be added,37 the tasks of
proposing, illustrating, and justifying them would considerably
expand the scope of this article and dilute the emphasis on the
basic structure of the proposed framework. For example, the ap-
plication of formal tests of consistency would require the detailed
examination of specific proposals. The analysis, therefore, is lim-
ited to the two formal criteria of minimal ambiguity and justifica-
tion.
In addition to these formal requisites, substantive standards
such as the following could be proposed:
(1) The test should not be a "pie in the sky;" rather, it should
be an empirically accurate description of how the courts
do/will/can determine UDPD.
(2) The test should maximize social utility.
Some such substantive criteria are crucial to a complete evalua-
tion of any doctrinal proposal because doctrine could be unambi-
guous and justified yet still be offensive to "common sense" or
fundamental notions of substantive justice. 8 For example, a doc-
trine which granted entitlements on the basis of race might sat-
isfy the formal criteria yet be morally offensive to many people.
Although this article recognizes the importance of substantive
37. Lon Fuller, for example, would require that, in order to be called "law," a rule
should, among other things, be consistent so that it does not require contradictory behav-
ior. L. FuuxR, supra note 29, at 65-70. Similarly, Jerome Hall adopts consistency in de-
veloping some measures of a good jurisprudential theory, Hall, Integrative Jurisprudence,
27 HASTINGS L.J. 779 (1976), while Norman Bowie evaluates theories of distributive justice
partly in terms of consistency. N. Bowis, supra note 35. W.V. Quine and J.S. Ullian offer
five "virtues" which can be used in conjunction with specificity or nonambiguity to mea-
sure the "plausibility" of a predictive theory: conservatism, generality, simplicity, refuta-
bility, and modesty. W. QUINE & J. ULuAN, supra note 35, at 42-53, 65-66 (1970).
38. See, e.g., R. BEARDs oRE, MoRAL REAsONING (1969); J. RAWLs, supra note 28, at
46-53. This limitation parallels the limitations on formal theories of justice discussed in
notes 33-34 supra. The crucial role of subjective perceptions in justification is discussed
in note 36 supra.
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criteria in any "ought"-oriented doctrine, specific substantive
proposals are not considered because such notions of proper doc-
trine are much more individualized than the formal require-
ments. As a result of this increased individual variation, the de-
velopment of substantive criteria which are not only specific
enough to be workable but also acceptable to many persons is a
difficult, if not impossible, task, far beyond the scope of this
article."
Although as a result of this omission, the proposed criteria
for evaluating normative doctrine are incomplete, they neverthe-
less are useful in a limited sense. There is nothing per se wrong
with a limited standard so long as it is helpful: problems arise
only when one loses sight of the limitations and tries to use such
a standard where it is inapplicable."
I. TESTS FOR IDENTIFYING AN UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS
PRODUCT DEFECT
The primary existing rule for identifying UDPD is section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which imposes strict
liability for physical harm on one "who sells any product in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or con-
sumer or to his property."' Several comments to this section,
39. See notes 117-123, 128-138 and accompanying text infra. One difficulty with
substantive proposals is that they are subjective. However, the formal requirements are
also subjective or cultural in that some people or cultures do/could use different criteria.
Cf., e.g., Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PmosopHy & PuB. AFF. 66, 75-
78 (1972). However, this subjectivity is not so individualized as that involved in substan-
tive notions of justice.
40. See notes 103-09, 115-23 and accompanying text infra.
41. The section as a whole provides:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Con-
sumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
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when read together, provide that UDPD is "a condition not con-
templated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably
dangerous to him."4 The contemplated condition is determined
by reference to normal (common, ordinary) consumer expecta-
tions under normal conditions.4 3 If the danger exceeds such expec-
tations then the product is "unreasonably dangerous."4 Another
comment provides that UDPD is determined by considering
whether the benefits offered by the product outweigh the risks
which cannot be eliminated by existing technology. 5 Thus, the
comments to section 402A suggest two different perspectives on
UDPD: (1) consumer expectations and (2) cost-benefit compari-
sons.
The following diagram illustrates some of the possible reac-
tions to this existing rule:
(A) (B)
Accept general Reject general
framework of framework of
Restatement Restatement
(A-i) (A-2) (B-1) (B-2)
Accept both per- Accept only one Accept UDPD as Reject UDPD
spectives perspective test for liabil- as test for






Accept only cost- Accept only consumer-
benefit perspective expectation perspective
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). This is not the only existing rule. For
example, there are alternative judicial, see, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d
121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972), and statutory rules, see, e.g., UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314 through-316, -318, -715(2), -719(3).
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, Comment g (1965).
43. Id., Comments g, h, & j.
44. Id., Comment i.
45. Id., Comment k. This comment is quoted in note 108 infra.
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Since the proposed framework for analyzing doctrine can be illus-
trated without a full analysis of all these possible responses, this
article will focus on Restatement-oriented proposals which state
that only a cost-benefit (A-2-a) or a consumer-expectation (A-2-
b) definition of UDPD "ought" to be adopted.
Although strict liability differs from negligence,49 these two
tests of UDPD have been selected because they parallel the two
models of "reasonable" behavior used in traditional fault analy-
sis. The "calculus of risk" has long been used as a standard for
determining unreasonable conduct,"° and it is not surprising that
46. There are a number of possible syntheses. One such possibility is to view the two
perspectives as integral parts of a single test - for example, risks and benefits are evalu-
ated from the standpoint of the reasonable consumer. See, e.g., Welch v. Outboard Marine
Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1973); Phillips v. Kimmood Mach. Co., 269 Ore. 485,
494-96, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036-37 (1974). Another approach would be to impose liability on
the seller if either test, cost-benefit or "reasonable consumer expectation," is satisfied.
E.g., Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort
Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. Rav. 803, 846 (1976). A variation on this second
synthesis is to use one of the two tests as the primary standard, while employing the other
as a secondary standard when the results under the primary standard offend some (intui-
tive) notion of "correct" decision. Cf., e.g., id. at 818 (cost-benefit as primary test); Shapo,
A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function, and Legal Liabil-
ity for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109, 1225, 1294, 1370 (1974) ("Seller-
induced consumer expectation" as initial and principal focus in decision); see notes 47,
94 infra and APPENDIX 2 for further discussion of Shapo's approach.
47. Marshall Shapo, for example, views UDPD as existing when a product fails to
satisfy those consumer expectations which result from the seller's representations.
Shapo, supra note 46, at 1369. For further discussion of Shapo's model, see note 94 infra
and APPENDIX 2. Although consistent with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS in
many respects, Shapo's model is intended to "provide a completely new approach." Id.
at 1370; see id. at 1251-58.
48. The strict-liability framework of Calabresi and Hirschoff, for example, empha-
sizes cost reduction and places liability on the person best able to determine the relation-
ship of costs to benefits and to reduce costs. Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 3. See, e.g.,
G. CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF AccmENvs (1970). See APPENDIX 2 for further discussion
of this standard. This approach rejects the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS concern with
UDPD and searches instead for the best cost evaluator/preventor. Compare Calabresi &
Hirschoff, supra note 3, at 1064-65, with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Com-
ments j, k, & n (1965).
Another alternative is the approach of the California Supreme Court, which rejects
the RESTATEMENT position and requires only that the plaintiff prove a defect; there is no
need to prove that it is unreasonably dangerous. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d
121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
49. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282, Comment c, §§ 291-293 (1963); RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS H9 519, 520(a) (1938); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520(a) - 520(c),
520(f) (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964); W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at § 31; Posner, A Theory of
Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972); Terry, Negligence, 29 HAzv. L. Rav. 40 (1915).
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a similar efficiency calculus is proposed for defining UDPD. A
second model of reasonable behavior is reflected in the concept
of an average, normal man whose perceptions and capabilities
can be used in evaluating the reasonableness of harm-causing
conduct."
This abstract "reasonable man," now acting as a consumer
rather than as an injurer,52 could be employed to determine the
existence of UDPD. Thus, the analysis of UDPD cannot only use
existing theoretical discussions of the fault system but also eluci-
date these discussions.
The jurisprudential framework sketched in this article can
assist the comparison of these approaches to UDPD in several
ways. First, the formal criteria of minimal ambiguity and justifi-
cation can be used to evaluate each test. Second, the doctrinal
proposals can be viewed in terms of officials' distribution and
enforcement of entitlements. Finally, both tests are pro-
posed/used: (1) in related, "fault"-oriented tort doctrines, (2) in
granting and enforcing entitlements in other areas of the law,53
51. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRs §§ 519, 520 (d), (e) (Tent. Draft No.
10, 1964); W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at §§ 32-33.
52. In traditional fault analysis, the injurer could be the defendant (negligence)
and/or the plaintiff (contributory negligence). For further discussion of the two-fold nature
of the negligence test, see note 21 supra. The effects of the shift in viewing the "reasonable
man" from an injuring-acts-perspective to a consumer-knowledge-perspective should be
kept in mind because the reasonableness of some of the victim's acts is irrelevant under
§ 402A. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965).
53. The concept of reasonable expectations is a core concept in contract law. Profes-
sor Corbin, for example, begins his treatise by asserting that the "Main Purpose of Con-
tract Law is the Realization of Reasonable Expectations Induced by Promises." A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 1 (One vol. ed. 1952). Cost-benefit analysis is central to numerous
types of administrative determinations. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), in which the analysis of available alternative highway routes
is viewed in terms of balance of costs vis-A-vis benefits of route through public parkland.
From a more general perspective, the central role that these two models play in
modem legal systems is reflected, for example, by Rosco Pound's five "jural postulates of
civilized society in our time and place." R. POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAw 113-15
(1942). One of these postulates is directed toward "expectations" while another is directed
toward unreasonable risk. Id. at 114. A similar indication of the importance of these two
models is Roberto Unger's assertion that the use of broad, policy-oriented standards in
modern jurisprudence, see notes 115-22 and accompanying text infra, invites "their ap-
pliers to make use of the technician's conception of efficiency or the layman's view
[expectation] of justice." R. UNGER, supra note 34, at 199. Similarly, Judge Cardozo, who
considered law as concerned with "social welfare," viewed social welfare as a concept
defined either by "expediency or prudence" or by "the social sense of justice, whether
formulated in creed or system, or immanent in the common mind." B. CARnozo, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 72 (1921).
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and (3) in the analysis of related issues in other disciplines., '
Jurisprudential analysis of these tests in other settings is, there-
fore, relevant in evaluating them within the context of section
402A.
A. The "Cost-Benefit" Model
1. The Basic or Core Model. The cost-benefit or efficiency
approach to entitlements has been formulated in various ways,55
but there is a common core of agreement on the basic principle
54. The concept of a rational maximizer is found, for example, in philosophy and
economics, see note 55 infra, while the concept of "reasonable" or "representative" expec-
tations is developed in such disciplines as sociology, see, e.g., G. HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAV-
IoR: ITS ELEMENTARY FORMS 72-78, 232-47, 265-76 (1961); 225-68 (rev. ed. 1974); W. RUNci-
MAN, RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1960); P. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND
INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE (1969); philosophy, see, e.g., J. RAWLS, supra note 29 at 64; and eco-
nomics. See, e.g., H. Hochman, Rule Change and Transitional Equity, REDISTRIBUTION
THROUGH PUBLIC CHOICE 320 (H. Hochman & G. Peterson eds. 1974). See note 90 infra for
further discussion of expectation models.
55. For example, such proposals have taken the form of:
(1) Utilitarian philosophical proposals that entitlements should be distributed
and enforced in the manner which will maximize happiness or utility and mini-
mize pain, e.g., J. S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1863).
(2) Economic proposals that entitlement issues should be viewed from an effi-
ciency perspective which focuses on maximizing or optimizing happiness/utility
by striving to satisfy two conditions:
(a) The level of any output X should be such that the marginal social
utility (MSU) of X is equal to its marginal social cost (MSC).
(b) The level of any number of outputs (X,, X,, . . . ,X,) should be
such that the ratio of the marginal social utility of each output to the
marginal social cost of that output equals the corresponding ratio for
other commodities.
Thus, efficiency requires that the following be satisfied:
MSU. = MSCX
MSU . _ MSU X2 MSU X
MSC , MSC X2  MSC Xn
Given the difficulties with defining utility (see note 67 and accompanying text
infra) economists often impose as a third condition for efficiency the require-
ment that there be an optimal price system. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC
THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 379-408 (3d ed. 1972); N. BOWIE, supra note
37, at 24-27.
(3) Pragmatic proposals concerning the most efficient solution of particular
"real-world" problems by systematic examination of a given number of possible
solutions in order to select the optimum alternative(s). See, e.g., H. RAIFFA,
DECISION ANALYSIS 295 (1970). E. MISHAN, ECONOMICS FOR SOCIAL DECISIONS
(1972).
(4) Legal proposals concerning the proper doctrinal test for determining (a)
fault, see, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291-295 (1965); and (b) UDPD. See authori-
ties cited in note 69 infra.
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that "more is better" and on the decision norm that:
Given two courses of action, A and B, if B would result in more
happiness for society than A, then officials ought to "choose"
B.58
This core conception of proper/reasonable/rational behavior
supports the following test for a definition of UDPD:
Given two courses of action, A (selling a product in X condition)
and B (not selling the product or selling it in -X condition), 7
if B would result in more happiness for society than A, then
officials should decide that the product has an UDPD if course
A is followed.
The application of this model requires: first, some measure of
benefits (i.e., increases in "happiness") and costs (i.e., pain, un-
happiness, or decreases in happiness) so that comparisons may be
made; and second, some probability assessments (p) of the oc-
currence potential of particular benefits (b1, b2, . . . b ,,) and costs
(c,, c2, . . . cJ so that the expected benefits and costs for each
alternative can be calculated in some such manner as:
Potential costs = (c, x Pc) + (c2 x Pc2) + ' .' + (Cn x Pc')
Potential benefits = (b, x pb) + (b2 x Pb2) + " " . + (bn x Pbn
2. Evaluation in Terms of Formal Criteria. Inherent in the
use of this basic model are a number of limitations,"s which can
be categorized in terms of the two formal criteria for evaluating
normative doctrine: ambiguity and justification:
(1) Efficiency analysis is imprecise because of certain built-in
ambiguities in the core model.
56. For a discussion of the complexity involved in "choosing" a particular course of
conduct, see notes 8-29 and accompanying text supra.
57. The symbol "-" indicates the negation of whatever follows.
58. The textual criticisms of the limits of the model should be distinguished from
criticisms of misuse of the model. An example of such misuse is the tendency to confuse
the model's assumption that man can usefully be viewed as a rational maximizer with a
broader assumption that man is a rational maximizer. This confusion blurs the distinction
between the "efficient" solution to a problem and the proper "real-world" solution. See,
e.g., Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHILOSOPHY & PuB. AFFAIS,
3 (1975); Buchanan, Good Economics - Bad Law, 60 VA. L. REv. 483 (1974); Leff,
Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451, 470-74,
477-82 (1974); Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's
Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87 HARv. L. Rxv. 1655 (1974); Tribe, Policy
Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHILOSOPHY & PUs. AFFAIRS 66 (1972).
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(2) Efficiency analysis alone cannot justify (a) any particular
resolution of the innate ambiguities or (b) any particular alloca-
tion and enforcement of entitlements in society.
(a) Ambiguity. Any specific cost-benefit formulation of
"proper" behavior is inherently ambiguous if it does not include
a definition of the scope of items being evaluated. For example,
if a product p, of a class of of products P is used by u, of a class of
users U, does the analysis involve optimizing benefits vis-a-vis
costs in terms u,'s use of p, or of U's use of P?5 If classes of
products and/or of users are to be considered, how is the scope of
each class to be determined?"0 Even if such classes can be defined
there will still be ambiguities in the relationships among classes
and subclasses. For example, a product p, (or class of products P)
will have a class of costs C associated with its use. In a particular
situation certain potential costs of this class (c,, c2, . . . c ) will
be directed toward one class of users U,, while others (c,+,, c n+2
C n+m) will be directed toward another class of users U2. If u,
of the class U, is injured by the product, is the subclass of the
potential costs directed toward U relevant for the cost-benefit
comparisons involving u,?"'
59. See, e.g., N. BOWIE, supra note 35, at 31-32; R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICAL
DECISION (1961); Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHmLosopmcAL Rav. 3 (1955). See notes
71, 76, 78 infra for further discussion of this issue.
60. This is not a minor problem because nearly all similar items can be viewed both
as having subsets and as being subsets of some larger aggregation. Consider, for example,
the problems if U and P have subclasses - e.g., "new P" and "used P;" presently living
U and future U - and if U and P are themselves subclasses of larger aggregations - e.g.,
if P is a car of X type, then P is a subclass of the class of all automobiles; U is a subclass
of all humans, past, present, and future. At some point a line must be drawn and drawing
such a line presents the problem of distinguishing "like cases" from "unlike cases." See
note 33 supra. The classification problem is discussed further in note 72 infra.
61. The problems resulting from this inherent ambiguity are presented in many
"proximate cause" and "duty" cases, particularly where non-users (bystanders) are in-
volved. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), (Mrs.
Palsgraf, a bystander, can be viewed as similar to u, in the textual example while the
passenger with the package is u,.); RFsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §402A, Comment o
(1965) ("Injuries to non-users and non-consumers. . . . The Institute expresses neither
approval nor disapproval of expansion of the rule to permit recovery by such persons.")
(emphasis in original). Even if the analysis in the textual example were limited to u,, there
would still be the problem of determining which risks of the set (c,, c2, . . - , cn) are
relevant. Compare, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 17 (1965) with, e.g., Santor v. A. & M. Karaghensian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305
(1965); compare, e.g., In re Polemis, 3 K.B. 560, All E.R. 40 (Ct. App. 1921) with, e.g.,
Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd. (The Wagon
Mound), [1961] A.C. 388 and Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. The Miller Steamship
Co. (The Wagon Mound (No. 2)) [1966] 1 A.C. 617. Defining the relevant costs can be
[Vol. 28606
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Other ambiguities emerge concerning the exact nature of the
comparison of costs and benefits. First, many formulations of
cost-benefit analysis do not specify whether one is maximizing
the ratio of costs to benefits or the excess of benefits over costs. 2
For example, if the following mutually exclusive alternatives are
the only practical alternatives and if the costs and benefits in
each have been discounted by probability assessments, which is
reasonable or preferable?
Alternative A: Cost is 100, benefit is 200. (Ratio of costs-
benefits 1:2.000 while excess benefits are
100).
Alternative B: Cost is 150, benefit is 275. (Ratio of costs-
benefits 1:1.833 while excess benefits are
125).
The uncertainty in the comparison is increased when one consid-
ers variations in attitudes toward certain types of potential costs
and benefits. For example, which of the following mutually exclu-
sive alternatives is reasonable or preferable?
Alternative A:
Potential costs = 1,000,000 units (death) x .0001 -
100 units
Potential benefits = 1,000,000 units x .1 =-- 100,000
units
Aternative B:
Potential costs =- 100 units (lost leisure) x 1 -= 100 units
Potential benefits = 1000 units x 1 = 1000 units
restated as an attempt to distinguish between all costs (or "harms") and all legally
cognizable costs (or in the schematic system of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 1,
7 (1965)) "injuries" in the terminology of the RESTATEMENT. In a theoretical sense some
such distinction is necessary if the concept of right (i.e., legally protected interests or costs,
id.) is to have any meaning. The distinction is also necessary from a practical point of
view. See note 65 and accompanying text infra.
The "process" becomes even more complicated when one considers classes of injurers.
For example, designing a "safer" product may so involve the entire industry producing
the product that it is "unfair" to focus on only one seller of the class of sellers. Cf., e.g.,
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y. 2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970):
[Techniques to eliminate dust and other annoying by-products of cement
making are unlikely to be developed by any research the defendant can under-
take within any short period, but will depend on the total resources of the
cement industry Nationwide and throughout the world. The problem is univer-
sal wherever cement is made.
For obvious reasons the rate of the research is beyond control of defendant.
If at the end of 18 months the whole industry has not found a technical solution
a court would be hard put to close down this one cement plant if due regard be
given to equitable principles.
Id. at 225-26, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
62. One resolution of this ambiguity is proposed in E. MIsHAN, supra note 55, at 134-
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The ratio of potential benefits to costs in Alternative A (1000:1)
is much greater than the ratio in Alternative B (10:1); neverthe-
less, many persons would prefer the certain return in Alternative
B to a one-in-ten thousand chance of death in Alternative A
because death is so uniquely total and final.63 A third ambiguity
in the comparison of risks and benefits occurs when it is not clear
whether the concern is with the sum of costs versus the sum of
benefits or with the marginal increases in cost and benefits.
Under either test the conduct from 0 to E in the graph below is
reasonable and the conduct from 0 to G is unreasonable. How-
ever, the particular formulation chosen will have a variable im-
pact on whether the conduct from E to H and from G to H is
viewed as reasonable because at any point between 0 and H on
OEH the sum of benefits exceeds the sum of costs although on
EH the marginal costs exceed the marginal benefits. On the other
hand, at any point between 0 and H on OGH the reverse is true,
i.e., at all points between 0 and H on OGH the sum of costs
exceeds the sum of benefits while on GH the marginal benefits
exceed the marginal costs.
63. Some people - e.g., an Evel Knievel - would be willing to attempt to cross a
river with a rocket-equipped motorcycle, while others would not, even though a potential
gain of millions of dollars were involved. Another example of special concern for
"catastrophic" loss is reflected in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 293(d), Comment d
(1965). Some proposed strategies for making "rational" decisions where "risk" is involved
are discussed in, e.g., W. BAUMOL, ECONoMic THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 576-82 (3d
ed. 1972).
The difficulties involved in comparing diverse "goods" like leisure and life in terms
of equivalent units are discussed in notes 67 & 68 and accompanying text infra.
64. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, supra note 29, at §§ 27 & 30. Both of the conceptions in the
text support intuitively offensive positions. For example:
-If the former conception (total happiness) is chosen, a society of 1,000,000,000
persons with a total net benefit of 1,000,000,000 units per year (1 unit per person)
should be preferable to a society with 1,000 persons and total net benefits of
500,000,000 units (500 units per person).
-If the latter approach (average happiness) is chosen, then the manufacturer
of a drug that killed large numbers of people would be allowed to argue that his
action is "efficient" (because it increased average benefits per person) and
therefore "reasonable" and "proper."
The manufacturer's argument would be difficult to support because the costs resulting
from the death - e.g., grief of persons who loved the deceased, financial loss to those
dependent on the deceased, and general fear of those who might suffer a similar fate -
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Figure 1 - Graph of Variations in Relationship of Costs
to Benefits (The Line LL and the Line L L' are parallel to
OA)
A final ambiguity concerning efficiency proposals is that the core
conception does not indicate whether one is maximizing the total
amount of happiness in society or the average amount of happi-
ness per person."
The practical process of identifying and evaluating costs and
benefits is also plagued by ambiguity. This uncertainty has sev-
eral dimensions:
(1) There are so many possible alternative products and so
many potential costs and benefits associated with any product
that it simply is not practical to attempt to weigh all these
variables. But how does one determine which alternatives and
would probably have a large impact on the utilitarian calculus. Further, it would be
intuitively offensive to many persons even to grant the manufacturer the opportunity to
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which of the potential costs and benefits will be considered? 5
For example, should aesthetic injury from nonbiodegradable
containers count in determining UDPD?66
(2) How is the worth of the various costs and benefits deter-
mined? 7 For example, what is a (statistical) life worth?68
(3) How are the uncertainties of the "real world" handled? 9
For example, forecasting potential costs and benefits is such an
imprecise undertaking that "good-faith," nonnegligent mis-
65. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 198-235 (1970). The issue in the
text above exists where there is a statistical certainty that the product will be involved in
some accidents and the plaintiff asserts that the cost-benefit examination of the product
design should include possible reductions in the injury costs in such "inevitable" acci-
dents. Compare, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (cost
included) with, e.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 836 (cost not included); see generally APPENDIX 2. The practical
problem of determining what costs and benefits count in any comparison overlaps some-
what with the conceptual issue, raised in note 61 and accompanying text supra, of whether
a cost in one comparison will count in another comparison.
66. In another context, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment h at 352
(1965), provides that there is no apparent reason "for distinguishing between the product
itself and the container in which it is supplied."
67. See, e.g., N. BOWIE, supra note 35, at 16-19, 29-30, 40-46. One proponent of cost-
benefit approaches to liability, Learned Hand, candidly admitted that the items to be
compared could not be quantified:
The degree of care demanded of a person by an occasion is the resultant of
three factors: the likelihood that his conduct will injure others, taken with the
seriousness of the injury if it happens, and balanced against the interest which
he must sacrifice to avoid the risk. All these are practically not susceptible of
any quantitative estimate, and the second two are generally not so, even theoret-
ically. For this reason a solution always involves some preference, or choice
between incommensurables ....
Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 312 U.S. 492
(1941).
The process of identifying and measuring costs and benefits is complicated by two
considerations. First, the "values" underlying this evaluative process change over time.
See, e.g., J. LUcAs, supra note 7, at § 39 at 170 (1966); cf., e.g., VALUES AND THE FUTURE
(K. Baier & N. Rescher eds. 1969). Thus, an act which is efficient in terms of its potential
costs and benefits as measured at a given point in time might be inefficient when mea-
sured against the value scheme of another era. Second, the distinction between cost and
benefit is not always clear because any such distinction rests on an underlying concept of
"good," which presents the difficult questions of substantive justice. See notes 33-34
supra, note 36 and accompanying text supra, and notes 115-38 and accompanying text
infra.
68. For a discussion of the value of a (statistical) life, see e.g., C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY
OF VALUES 207-36 (1970). For indications that the concept of a person or a life is also
ambiguous, cf., e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); N. ST. JOHN-STFvAs, LIFE, DEATH
AND THE LAW (1961).
69. For a general discussion of the difficulties involved in applying cost-benefit analy-
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takes will be made and nonefficient acts will occur." Will these
acts be measured in terms of forecasts or in terms of actual costs
and benefits?7'
(4) Which "real world" institution or "official" should make
the assessments? 2 What procedures should the designated insti-
70. See, e.g., R. AYRES, TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING AND LONG-RANGE PLANNING
(1969), J. MARTINO, TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING FOR DECISION MAKING (1972). The process
becomes even more complicated if one includes the problem, discussed in note 67 supra,
of forecasting changes in values.
71. The seller would be liable under traditional negligence principles if the foreseea-
ble potential costs resulting from error outweighed the foreseeable potential costs of avoid-
ing such error. It has been argued that such negligence calculation should be irrelevant
in product liability cases because it is more "efficient" in terms of administrative costs
to consider only the facts as known at the time of trial since an "enormous amount of the
time of courts, investigations and lawyers can be expended in an effort to ascertain
whether a . . . [product] involved a risk . . . that could have been known prior to
experience with its use. . . ." Keeton, Products Liability - Inadequacy of Information,
48 TEx. L. REV. 398, 409 (1970); see, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Ore. 485,
525 P.2d 1033 (1974). Although this argument has merit, see note 76 infra, the concern
with administrative costs presents new questions:
(1) Why is a consideration of costs versus benefits based on the facts known
at the time of trial worth the administrative cost? The benefits from preventing
losses are not the answer because the losses involved in the trial, being unpre-
dictable, should not/could not have been prevented while future losses, which
are now foreseeable, could be prevented by liability for negligence. One might
justify this approach on the ground that our present knowledge of foreseeable
costs can be improved if we adopt a doctrine which gives the plaintiff an incen-
tive to bring suit and thus improve our knowledge of past costs. Cf., e.g., Cala-
bresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr.,
43 U. CI. L. REv. 69, 88 (1975). Other concerns might also justify the result but
such concerns require either: (a) an expanded cost-benefit analysis like that in
note 76 infra; or (b) a reliance on nonefficiency values, see notes 79-86 and
accompanying text infra.
(2) Why would a determination of foreseeability ever be worth the cost? Kee-
ton argues that the costs and benefits of the product should be evaluated on the
basis of knowledge available at the time of trial, but that the adequacy of
warnings should be tested against the reasonable foreseeability of their reaching
the consumer rather than the actual receipt of the warning by the consumer:
Yet there are too many reasons, including misconduct of physicians
and others, to subject makers of drugs to liability for harm resulting from
a good drug just because the victim did not receive actual notice of the
danger and could have arrived at a different decision.
Keeton, supra, at 413 (emphasis in original). This concern for subjecting drug
makers to liability where events are beyond their control is understandable.
However, even though unforeseeable costs are also beyond the manufacturers'
control, Keeton would subject them to liability if total costs (including unfore-
seeable costs) exceed total benefits.
(3) Would the test be symmetrical so that a "negligent" manufacturer is not
liable if his product has such unexpected side benefits that at the time of trial
the benefits exceed the costs?
72. Issues concerning the proper institution present not only the problem of choosing
1977]
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tution use in making assessments? 3
Even if the preceding ambiguities could be resolved, there
still would remain the problem of using efficiency assessments to
determine proper entitlement decisions. For example, a conclu-
sion that the benefits of an act/product (or class of acts/products)
exceed the costs does not determine:
(1) Who should be granted a particular entitlement as between
the actor and those initially suffering the costs? For example,
the benefits of manufacturing, selling, and driving automobiles
between legislative, judicial, and administrative forums but also of choosing the appropri-
ate governmental unit in our federal system: federal, state, or local government. Cf., e.g.,
Heller, The Importance of Normative Decisionmaking: The Limitations of Legal Econom-
ics as a Basis for a Liberal Jurisprudence - As Illustrated by the Regulation of Vacation
Home Development, 1976 Wis. L. Rsv. 385, 466-68.
Certain efficiency-oriented proposals have been made. See, e.g., G. CALABREsI, THE
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, 146-47, 225-26, 251 (1970); Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufac-
turers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1531
(1973); Henderson, Design Defect Litigation Revisited, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 541 (1976); cf.,
e.g., Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 3, at 1055, 1060-61. Yet these proposals are subject
to criticism. Calabresi's approach, for example, requires some criteria for defining classes
of sellers/users/products/costs/benefits, see notes 59-61 and accompanying text supra, and
he himself candidly acknowledges some of the difficulties with developing such criteria.
Cf. G. CALABRESI, supra, at 145-47. Henderson's approach also exemplifies the crucial role
that classification plays in efficiency analysis. He defines "design" as the class of acts
involved in developing a "blueprint" of a completed product. This definition excludes
from design the development and implementation of manufacturing and testing proce-
dures for producing a product which conforms to the design "blueprint." Based on this
classification of "design"/''non design" acts, Henderson argues that: (1) evaluating design
is a complex undertaking involving many interrelated variables while determining non-
conformity with design is a simple task; (2) courts are not capable of evaluating complex
decisions based on interrelated variables; and (3) courts, therefore, should not review
design decisions and should impose liability only for nonconformity. However, one could
rationally classify not only "design" decisions but also decisions concerning manufactur-
ing technique and the nature and amount of quality control as complex decisions involving
interrelated variables. (How much expensive testing for nonconformity is "enough"?).
This classification supports an argument that courts should never address any product-
related injuries because even nonconformity results from a complex design decision. In
short, Henderson's scheme is based on an implicit, underlying classification system of
complex and non-complex acts which is not necessarily correct. Cf. Twerski, Weinstein,
Donaher, & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability -Design Defect
Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495 (1976).
Even if an efficiency-oriented proposal could be developed for identifying the
"proper" forum, there still would be problems where the "proper" forum is not available
for some reason and where the forum suggested by efficiency conflicts with the forum
suggested by such other values as "majoritarian democracy." See notes 79-86 and accom-
panying text infra.
73. If, for example, a court is designated as the "proper" forum, a number of issues
arise concerning burdens of pleading and proof, rights to counsel and expert witnesses,
etc.
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may exceed the costs, but this does not dictate a conclusion that
persons injured by automobiles are not entitled to be free from
injury.7
4
(2) How should a system, after granting an entitlement to
those initially suffering costs, respond to a crossing of the border
defined by that entitlement? While cost-benefit analysis can
indicate whether the act should be prohibited, there are still
ambiguities. If the costs exceed the benefits, then efficiency
dictates that the act should be prohibited, but it does not neces-
sarily determine whether punishment, treatment, restraint, or
self-help is the appropriate response.75 If the benefits exceed
costs, then the act should be allowed in an efficient society.
However, requiring compensation and doing nothing are both
equally plausible so long as one looks only to the costs and
benefits of the act.70 Moreover, efficiency analysis is often neu-
tral as to the particular approach to compensation.7
74. Granting the entitlement to those injured and requiring compensation by the
actor(s) would arguably internalize the cost and thus not only provide incentives for safer
automobiles and safer conduct but also result in a more "efficient" social allocation. See,
e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 68-75, 136-38, 144-50 (1970); E. MISHAN, supra
note 55, at 85-100. The point is not that liability should always be imposed on the actor(s)
but rather that efficiency analysis cannot tell officials to whom entitlements should be
granted because in theory, neither approach - granting the entitlement to the actor(s)
or to those "injured" - is necessarily more likely to result in an efficient solution. See,
e.g., G. CALABRESI, supra at 135-37; Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. OF L. AND
ECON. 1 (1960).
One might go beyond the limits of theoretical models and devise a "practical" set of
efficiency guidelines for determining who should bear the costs, see, e.g., G. CALABRESI,
supra at 136-97; cf., e.g., R. POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAw 109-12 (1942), but even
with such guidelines efficiency analysis alone cannot determine the "proper" allocation.
See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, supra, at 90-94, 160. Thus, from both a practical and theoretical
perspective, the cost-benefit model does not (always) provide solutions to the problems
of granting entitlements. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, supra, at 135-97; R. POSNER,EcONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 94 (1972). Given this limit on efficiency analysis, some alternative, non-
efficiency framework is needed in (at least some) allocation decisions. The problems
involved in developing this framework are similar to the problems involved in determining
whether prohibition should involve compensation. See note 13 supra.
75. In theory, one could assess these alternatives in cost-benefit terms and select the
alternative which is most efficient. In practice, however, this would be virtually impossible
because of the various limits of any such cost-benefit analysis. See notes 59-74 supra and
notes 76-86 and accompanying text infra.
76. If the cost-benefit analysis is expanded beyond the act(s) involved to include
administrative costs and indirect costs, then the analysis would dictate the response as
follows:
(1) If the costs of responding by compensation exceed the benefits of compen-
sation, then there should be no response. Cf., e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS 225-26 (1970).
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(b) Justification. - These ambiguities might be resolved
by formulating a detailed, explicit efficiency test of UDPD. How-
ever, such an approach raises problems of justification because
one must support the selection of the chosen formula over some
alternative, equally plausible interpretation of the inherently
ambiguous directive: "Act so that happiness is maximized."
"Maximizing happiness" could mean either:
Formula 1: Maximize in the case of the use of this product (p)
of the class of products (P) by user/consumer (u,) of the class of
users/consumers (U).
or
Formula 2: Maximize in all cases of the use of P by U.
Efficiency analysis alone cannot indicate which formulation to
choose.78 Consequently, one must go beyond benefit maximiza-
tion to justify preferring Formula 1 to Formula 2.
Problems also arise in justifying the use of efficiency to deter-
mine the allocation and enforcement of rights when this determi-
nation offends other values such as equality or liberty.79 Since
UDPD decisions, like all entitlement decisions, involve a distri-
bution of scarce goods, 0 it is not surprising that these decisions
reflect concerns not only with efficiency8 but also with equality. 2
77. See, e.g., R. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 212, 220-
21 (1973); compare, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947)
(compensation for border crossing required where potential costs exceed potential bene-
fits) with, e.g., Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910)
(compensation required where potential benefits exceed potential costs). See notes 19-22
and accompanying text supra and APPENDIX 1 for discussions of the variety of possible
approaches to compensation.
78. See note 59 and accompanying text supra. Tests which include the costs of indivi-
dualizing in Formula 1, see notes 71-72, 76 supra, are based on an implicit assumption
that Formula 2 is the proper formulation. Richard Wasserstrom has proposed a two-step
procedure which is designed to mitigate the problem somewhat:
(1) Consult the existing utilitarian rule based on maximizing for all similar
cases.
(2) Consider whether the facts of the present case suggest a new utilitarian rule
that will result in greater utility in future cases than the existing rule. If such a
more efficient rule exists, adopt it.
R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDIcIAL DECISION 138-71 (1961). This procedure, however, clearly
is based on an acceptance of Formula 2.
79. See, e.g., N. BowiE, supra note 35, at 20-24, 30-39, 47-49; Baker, The Ideology of
the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHILOSOPHY AND PUB. AFF. 3 (1975); cf., e.g., Buchanan,
In Defense of Caveat Emptor, 38 U. CHI. L. Rlv. 64 (1970).
80. See notes 8 & 9 and accompanying text supra.
81. See note 89 infra and APPENDIX 2.
[Vol. 28
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Yet values such as efficiency and equality can conflict.13 Simi-
larly, liberty and efficiency can conflict. 4 For example, should
sellers and consumers be allowed to sell and use products which
are unreasonably dangerous or should such products be
prohibited? Efficiency analysis indicates that the products
should be prohibited in all cases; a concern for liberty suggests
that if these persons are always willing and able to compensate
for crossings or if persons threatened by the products consent to
crossings, then officials should never prohibit such products.85 If
82. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944)
("The cost of an injury and the loss of time and health may be an overwhelming misfor-
tune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the
manufacturer and distributed among the public as in cost of doing business." Id. at 462,
150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring)); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (Recovery based on implied warranty justified in part by asser-
tion that "the burden of losses consequent upon use of defective articles is borne by those
who are in a position to either control the danger or make an equitable distribution of the
losses when they do occur." Id. at 379, 161 A.2d at 81.) (emphasis added); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment c at 350 (1965) ("[P]ublic policy demands that the
burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon
those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability
insurance may be obtained; .. ."); G. CALABEESI, THE CosTs OF ACCIDENTS 39-67 (1970)
(See notes 153, 160 infra for further discussion of this concept within Calabresi's model);
Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and A Proposal, 24 STAN. L. REv. 439,
463-64 (1972).
83. See, e.g., N. BowIE, supra note 35 at 20-24; but see notes 87 & 88 and accompany-
ing text infra. For discussion of conflict where product-caused injuries are involved, see
notes 154 & 167 and accompanying text infra.
84. Cf., e.g., N. BOwIE, supra note 35 at 23-24; but see notes 87-88 and accompanying
text infra.
85. The issue of the propriety of prohibiting persons from voluntarily encountering
"unreasonable" risks has been presented in the review of statutes which prohibit persons
from riding motorcycles without helmets. See, e.g., Simon v. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277
(D. Mass.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 1020 (1972) (prohibition allowed since injuries indirectly
affect other persons); Everhardt v. City of New Orleans, 208 So. 2d 423 (La. App. 1968)
(prohibition not allowed); American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 158 N.W.2d 72 (Mich.
App. 1968) (prohibition not allowed); People v. Carmichael, 58 Misc. 2d 584, 279 N.Y.S.
2d 272 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1967) (prohibition not allowed); Robertson, An Instance of Effec-
tive Legal Regulation: Motorcyclist Helmet and Daytime Headlamp Laws, 10 LAW AND
Soc'Y REv. 467 (1976) (empirical study indicating that "[m]otorcycle helmet use laws
represent social policy that has been effective in achieving the purpose of reducing fatal
injuries." Id. at 475). For more general discussions of the question of why officials should
ever prohibit behavior rather than require compensation, see R. NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE
AND UTOPIA, 59-87 (1974) and Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1124-27. Where
consent is given to a border crossing, it would seem that liberty values are compromised
if the officials either prohibit the crossing or require compensation because both prohibi-
tion and compensation are the equivalent of denying the right to consent to crossings. See,
e.g., J. MILL, ON LIBERTY; cf., e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra, at 1111-15. For further
authorities concerning consent, see note 11 supra.
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efficiency should not always prevail in situations like these where
values conflict, then some broader approach must be proposed for
resolving the conflict in particular cases or classes of cases."5
Since concepts such as liberty and equality have at least as
much potential ambiguity as efficiency, 7 it would be possible to
Economic models of efficiency often assert that there is no conflict between efficiency
and liberty because liberty is furthered by a cost-benefit perspective so long as free mar-
kets, based on the free choices of producers and consumers, dictate decisions. See, e.g.,
N. BowIE, supra note 35, at 38-39, 48-49, 68-70 (1971); Baker, The Ideology of the Eco-
nomic Analysis of Law, 5 PmLosoPHY & PuB. AFF. 3, 32-33 (1975). However, this assertion
is subject to several objections:
(1) The conditions necessary for an ideal free market do not exist in the real
world. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 392-
95 (3d ed. 1972); N. BOWIE, supra, at 68-70; Bator, The Anatomy of Market
Failure, 72 Q. J. ECON. 351 (1958).
(2) The limits imposed by the market on behavior are not necessarily less
undesirable than limits imposed by officials. N. Bowm, supra, at 48-49, 70-75.
This can be a serious problem where an unequal distribution of income or talents
results in wide variations in the "freedom" of individuals as consumers or produ-
cers in the free market, see, e.g., W. BAUMOL, supra, at 389, or where deviations
from the ideal market result in producers/sellers having considerable control
over workers and consumers. See, e.g., Baker, supra, at 36-41.
(3) Free markets require the prohibition of "intentional" border crossings
without consent even where compensation is offered. See, e.g., R. NoZICK, supra,
at 63-71; Calabresi & Melamed, supra, at 1111-15. Yet the mass production and
sale of products involves statistically certain border crossings to persons who
may not have consented - e.g., bystanders. See APPENDIX 2
("Certain"/"intentional" crossings exist not only in Case 11, but also in Cases
01 and 10.) Prohibiting such production and sale would often be inefficient, see
Calabresi & Melamed, supra, at 1111-15, yet allowing it would seem to infringe
on the liberty of those who did not consent to the crossings. This infringement
is reduced considerably if the amount of compensation could be set by the
person whose border is crossed because he could not complain of being denied
any potential benefits from bargaining. However, allowing these persons to de-
termine unilaterally the value of their injury would present problems - for
example, they would be tempted to overstate the value which could lead to an
inefficient result. Id.
(4) Even if liberty is furthered by a free market, it is debatable whether a free
market maximizes utility if there is gross disparity in the distribution of income.
See, e.g., Baker, supra, at 27-37. In this situation, efficiency (defined in terms
of maximizing utility) is reduced for the sake of liberty.
86. The possibility of such conflict is usually noted in the formulation of cost-benefit
tests, but the tests do not indicate any particular resolution of the problem. See note 89
infra, text accompanying notes 115-22 infra, and APPENDIX 2.
87. The ambiguity of equality is reflected in the discussion of the principle "treat like
cases alike" in note 33 supra. For a more complete development of possible meanings of
equality, see N. BowIE, supra note 35, at 50-76. For a discussion of the argument that
liberty, defined in economic terms, is consistent with efficiency see note 85 supra. Some
possible meanings of both liberty and equality are discussed in J. RAwLs, supra note 29,
at § 12.
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minimize the conflict among values by adopting a particular defi-
nition. For example, if one defined "equality" in terms of equal
opportunity (rather than equal distribution of goods) and defined
"efficiency" in terms of a market where, inter alia, all sellers have
an equal opportunity to produce and sell, then equality and effi-
ciency could be consistent. However, this definitional solution to
value conflict does not eliminate the problem of justification be-
cause one still must justify the selection of a particular formula-
tion of equality and efficiency."
3. Summary Evaluation of Existing Cost - Benefit Propos-
als for Identifying UDPD. - No single article could evaluate the
various specific methods of clarifying and justifying "ought"-
oriented, cost-benefit approaches to the general social tasks of
granting and enforcing entitlements. It is sufficient for present
purposes to emphasize that where such a model is proposed for
the specific purpose of identifying UDPD, the need to clarify and
justify the underlying cost-benefit model is often ignored." Some
88. See discussion accompanying note 78 supra.
89. For examples of such proposals, see Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning
of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L. J. 30 (1973); Keeton, Roger Traynor and the Law of Torts, 44
S. CALIF. L. REv. 1045 (1971); Keeton, Products Liability - Inadequacy of Information,
48 TEx. L. REV. 398 (1970); Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect"
in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REv. 559 (1969); Keeton,
Products Liability - Liability without Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEx.
L. REV. 855 (1963); Montgomery & Owen, supra note 46, at 803; Vetri, Products Liability:
The Developing Framework for Analysis, 54 ORE. L. REv. 293, 302-04, 309-10 (1975); Wade,
On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837 (1973); Wade,
Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965); but cf., e.g., Keeton, Products
Liability - Some Observations about Allocation of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1329 (1966).
Two points should be made concerning these proposals. First, many of the articles
are only partly concerned with developing "ought"-oriented purposes. Thus, a criticism
in terms of the criteria for evaluating such proposals should not be interpreted as a
criticism of the social contributions of these articles to such tasks as cataloguing and
reconciling cases. See text at conclusion of paragraph following note 34 supra. Second, the
articles do not completely ignore considerations raised by the criteria of justification and
minimal ambiguity. For example, some of these proposals incorporate "tradition" as a
justification for adopting a cost-benefit perspective and as a means of resolving ambiguity.
See, e.g., Montgomery & Owen, supra, at 812-14. Other justifications in addition to tradi-
tion are: (1) cost-benefit analysis "inheres in the phrase 'unreasonably dangerous,'"
Montgomery & Owen, supra, at 814; (2) the (particular) proposed analysis does not stray
"too far from accepted doctrine," id. at 817; and (3) the (particular) proposal is adminis-
tratively efficient and practical, id.; see note 71 supra. Alternative approaches to ambigu-
ity are: (1) an implicit approach, adopted by nearly all writers, that resolves ambiguity
by the sheer number of fact situations discussed; (2) the presentation of an extremely
detailed proposal, e.g., Vetri, supra at 305-14; and (3) the replacement of ambiguity as a
central concern by the need for "flexibility," e.g., Montgomery & Owen, supra, at 838-
39; see note 35 supra; cf. notes 117-21 infra.
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implications of this omission are discussed below in Part I.
B. The "Reasonable Consumer Expectation" Model
1. The Basic or Core Model. - Although there are various
specific formulations of expectation models,90 all such proposals
are based on the following principle:
Given two courses of action, A and B, if B conforms to what the
members of society would expect of a "good" society and A does
not, then officials ought to "choose" B."'
Despite these occasional references to the issues presented by the need to provide
justification and minimize ambiguity, the articles indicate a pattern of inadequate treat-
ment of these issues. For example, the use of tradition to justify and clarify cost-benefit
proposals involves three difficulties. First, the use of an "is" - tradition, convention,
custom or "accepted doctrine" - to justify an "ought" - cost-benefit - is subject to the
criticism that existing law cannot justify itself. Cf., e.g., E. BARKER, GREEK POLITICAL
THEORY 74-89, 184-87 (1918); S. PUFENDORF, DE JuRz NATURAE rr GENTIUM Ch. III §§ 7-9
(1672) quoted in, G. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE 161, 171-73 (1973); Atkinson & Montefiore,
"Ought" and "Is", 33 PHILOSOPHY 29 (1958). See generally, L. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT
AND HISTORY (1953); SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE (c. 441 B.C.). Second, this approach assumes
that the cost-benefit tradition in tort law is unambiguous, which it is not. See, e.g., notes
60-61, 63, 65, 67, 71-73, 77 and accompanying text supra. Finally, although a tradition of
dealing with problems in a particular way is entitled to considerable deference, problems
arise insofar as conflicting traditions are involved - for example, consumer expectation
traditions, see notes 90-94 and accompanying text infra, and libertarian and egalitarian
traditions, see notes 79-86 and accompanying text supra. It is not enough to point to
tradition as a justification: one must also indicate why one tradition is superior to other,
conflicting traditions.
90. For example, such proposals have taken the form of:
(1) Empirically-oriented models designed to describe or predict behavior on
the basis of expectations. See, e.g., G. HoMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ITS ELEMEN-
TARY FORMS 72-78, 232-47, 265-77 (rev. ed. 1974).
(2) "Ought"-oriented models which are designed:
(a) to illustrate how officials wil/should decide in an "efficient" society.
See, e.g., H. HART, supra note 8, at 88-89, 191-93, 195-97; Hubbard, "One
Man's Theory. .. ": A Metatheoretical Analysis of H.L.A. Hart's MODEL
OF' LAW, 36 MD. L. REv. 39 (1976); or
(b) to assert/illustrate that the realization of the (reasonable) expecta-
tions/desires/purposes of citizens ought to dictate ethical decisions be-
cause such expectations/desires/purposes are inherently good or deserving
of respect. See, e.g., L. FULLER, supra note 29; J. HALL, LIVING LAw OF
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1949); R. POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 114
(1942); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv.
537 (1972); cf. note 85 supra. This type of expectation model applies with
particular force where officials are themselves responsible for expecta-
tions. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, supra note 29, at §§ 17, 38, 48.
"Ought"-oriented expectation models for deciding specific legal issues, see, e.g., note 53
supra and note 94 infra, are often based on a combination of both "ought"-oriented
perspectives. See, e.g., Shapo, supra note 46, at 1378-88.
91. For a discussion of the complexity involved in "choosing" a particular course of
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The application of this core principle requires that the mem-
bers of society (or some "significant" portion of them, e.g., con-
sumers)92 share common expectations. Where no such agreement
exists, it is necessary to distinguish somehow between expecta-
tions which are "proper," "fair," "legitimate," "representative,"
"normal," or "reasonable,"93 and those which are not. In such a
case the basic model becomes:
Given two courses of action, A and B, if B conforms to what is
"reasonably" expected of a "good" society by the members of a
particular society (or some "significant" portion of those mem-
bers) and A does not, then officials ought to "choose" B.
This core concept concerning proper official decisions supports
the following test for UDPD: 4
conduct, see notes 8-29 and accompanying text supra. This principle is not trivial because,
even though all members of society (including officials) might agree concerning A and B,
a "bad" official might choose A because of a reason such as self-interest or ignorance.
92. Identifying "significant" segments of society will present the "justification" prob-
lems involved in any classification scheme. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
93. Although each of these terms overlaps to a considerable extent, the distinct con-
notations of each would have to be elaborated in any complete consumer expectation
model.
94. Two broad, overlapping doctrinal categories are based on this core model because
consumer expectations can be divided into two general groups. First, there are those
expectations that result or could result from some communication between the seller and
the consumer. Second, there are expectations that arise from other sources. The first set
of expectations encompasses both an affirmative aspect (material misrepresentation) and
a negative aspect (inadequate warning). Affirmative misrepresentations are addressed by
strict liability doctrines, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §402B (1965), and by more
traditional doctrines such as fraud. See, e.g., Shapo, supra note 46 at 1155-1251. The
adequacy of a warning is determined in large part by what is generally known and recog-
nized by consumers, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A, Comment j (1965),
and is, therefore, measured against the second set of expectations - those arising from
sources other than the seller.
Marshall Shapo has offered an expectation model for products liability decisions
which centers initially and principally on seller-induced consumer expectations. Shapo,
supra, at 1370 (1974); see APPENDIX 2 for further development of this approach. In
Shapo's model, representations of a seller include not only statements made directly about
a product but also statements and conduct that take advantage of consumer expectations
that are generally known to exist; the act of marketing becomes itself a kind of representa-
tion in this context. As a result of this concern with existing consumer expectations, some
of the issues raised in notes 96-102 and accompanying text infra are relevant to Shapo's
model, and he discusses these issues in developing his concept of consumer expectations.
Id. at 1124-29, 1289-92, 1302-17, 1339-41, 1362-69. This discussion is informative, but it
does not contain solutions. For example, Shapo dismisses the question of whether one
considers a particular consumer or a class of consumers, see text accompanying note 96
infra, simply by noting that a court should consider the "intelligence and knowledge of
consumers generally and of the disappointed consumer in particular. "Id. at 1370 (empha-
sis added).
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Given two courses of action, A (selling a product in X condition)
and B (not selling the product or selling the product in -X
condition), if B conforms to or exceeds reasonable consumer
safety expectations and A does not conform, then officials
should decide that the product has an UDPD if course A is
followed.
2. Evaluation in Terms of Formal Criteria. - The
"reasonable consumer expectation" model presents a number of
problems when considered in terms of the proposed formal cri-
teria.9 5 First, any test for identifying such expectations involves
potential ambiguities similar to those involved in the cost-benefit
analysis - for example:
This non-answer to the issue of individualization versus categorization reflects
Shapo's lack of a substantive theory of the just distribution and enforcement of entitle-
ments. See id. at 1205, 1383-86. Although Shapo has a short discussion of substantive
principles, id. at 1384-86, his approach is basically a "process" model in which social facts,
id. at 1274, and citizen perceptions of justice, see id. at 1291-92, 1384-86, combine with
the intuitive perceptions of judges, cf. id. at 1306, to determine the appropriate response
in a given case. See id. at 1225, 1324, 1370-71. Although Shapo argues that his proposed
scheme "ought" to be adopted, see id. at 1371-88, he does not develop a model of a "just
court," see note 122 infra and accompanying text, and thus does not address the issues
presented by the limits inherent in any process model of what doctrine "ought" to be. See
note 34 supra; cf. text accompanying note 38 supra.
Reed Dickerson has offered a multi-faceted expectation model which defines a
"defective" product as one which meets the following criteria:
(1) The product carries a significant physical risk to a definable class of con-
sumer and the risk is ascertainable at least by the time of trial.
(2) The risk is one that the typical member of the class does not anticipate
and guard against.
(3) The risk threatens established consumer expectations with respect to a
contemplated use and manner of use of the product and a contemplated mini-
mum level of performance.
(4) The seller has reason to know of the contemplated use and, possibly where
injurious side effects are involved, has reasonable access to knowledge of the
particular risk involved.
(5) The seller knowingly participates in creating the contemplated use, or in
otherwise generating the relevant consumer expectations, in the way attributed
to him by the consumer.
Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a Product Have To Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301,
331 (1967). Dickerson's discussion of this model is helpful, id. at 305-18, but like Shapo's
model it basically relies on a process to determine "reasonable" expectations. For exam-
ple, he notes that a "judgment as to the reasonable expectations for a particular product
...is a familiar exercise in judicial empathy." Id. at 307.
95. A complete analysis of the "reasonable consumer expection" model would be very
similar to the analysis of the cost-benefit model because the underlying problems are so
similar. See notes 96-102 infra. Therefore, the textual discussion of the expectation model
is brief to minimize repetitive analysis.
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(1) Is the reasonable consumer/user measured against the
particular consumer (u,), the class of all consumers (U), or some
particular subclgss of consumers (u,, u2 ... , u )?
9
(2) How is the "reasonableness" of expectations determined?97
(3) Who should determine reasonableness? 8
Second, any particular unambiguous proposal must be justified
as superior not only to (a) other unambiguous consumer expecta-
tion proposals," but also to (b) nonconsumer approaches for allo-
cating and enforcing entitlements - for example, "reasonable
seller expectation" models or cost-benefit models.1w The expecta-
tion model would appear to fare better in terms of the justifica-
tion criterion because it is broad enough to include conflicting
values if we assume that a "reasonable consumer" would consider
efficiency, equality, liberty, etc. Thus, it would seem to be supe-
rior to the efficiency model. ' However, this "superiority" is pur-
chased at the cost of extreme ambiguity unless precise guidance
is given on how a "reasonable consumer" would evaluate these
conflicting values."2
Ill. EVALUATION OF THE FRAMEWORK AND THE ANALYSIS
A. Utility of the Framework and the Analysis
This article has developed a jurisprudential framework for
viewing doctrine within a social context and for developing and
96. See notes 59-61 and accompanying text supra for similar ambiguities in the cost-
benefit model. This problem inherent in expectation analysis arises not only in strict
products liability, see, e.g., Shapo, supra note 46, at 1304-11, but also in negligence
analysis. See notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra; cf., e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note
1, at 158-66.
97. See note 67 and accompanying text supra for similar ambiguities in cost-benefit
model. The problems with consumer expectation also parallel problems with defining
"reasonable man" in negligence analysis. See notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra;
cf., e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at § § 32-33, 35-36.
98. For discussion of similar problems with cost-benefit analysis see note 72 and
accompanying text supra. Parallel difficulties also arise in using concept of "reasonable
man" in negligence analysis. See notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra; cf., e.g., W.
PROSSER, supra note 1, at § 37.
99. For example, the question posed in the text accompanying note 89 supra could
have a number of different answers that are consistent with "consumer expectation"
analysis. See discussion of similar problems in the cost-benefit model at text accompany-
ing note 78 supra.
100. Cf., e.g., Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a Product Have to Be?,
42 IND. L.J. 301, 318-31 (1967).
101. See notes 79-86 and accompanying text supra.
102. See notes 115-20, 163-74 and accompanying text infra.
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evaluating "ought"-oriented doctrinal proposals in terms of two
criteria: minimal ambiguity and justification. These criteria were
illustrated by critically analyzing cost-benefit and consumer ex-
pectation approaches to the definition of an unreasonably danger-
ous product defect (UDPD). The framework and analysis are in-
tended to provide useful insights into the practical process of
deciding products liability cases and into the basic theoretical
structure both of UDPD doctrines and of related tort concepts of
"reasonableness."
1. Practical Utility. - The proposed framework views doc-
trine as the patterns emerging from specific decisions of offi-
cials. 3 From this perspective it follows that an "ought"-oriented
doctrine consists of patterns which ought to exist. ' Thus, a
model which purports to illustrate how UDPD decisions ought to
be decided must be able to direct, assist, or guide a judge (who
is surely an "official") ' in resolving such issues as:
(1) Whether a jury should consider the issue of UDPD?
(2) Whether particular evidence is relevant to UDPD?
(3) Whether particular jury instructions for determining
UDPD are appropriate?
The preceding analysis of two possible tests of UDPD indicates
that, as presently formulated, they are ambiguous directives and
that they are not justified except in terms of the subjective prefer-
ence of their proponents.' Consequently, the judge is left largely
to decide for himself how issues "ought" to be decided. ' This
article has not proposed a "better test," and some limited use of
these tests may not be unreasonable:' for example, where the
103. See text following note 26 supra.
104. See notes 29-34 and accompanying text supra.
105. Even though "official" is a somewhat vague term, it would seem that a judge is
clearly an "official." See, e.g., Rumble, Law as the Effective Decisions of Officials: A
"New Look" at Legal Realism, 20 J. PuB. L. 215, 224-26 (1971).
106. See note 89 and accompanying text supra.
107. If sufficiently developed, these frameworks do provide a judge with some guid-
ance. See note 120 and accompanying text infra.
108. It is often asserted that a "weak" theory is superior to no theory. See, e.g., J.
LUCAS, supra note 7, at §6. A similar assertion - i.e., that a "bad" product can be superior
to no product - is contained in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A, Comment k
(1965):
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge,
are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use.
These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is
the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads
[Vol. 28
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efficient result coincides with the consumer expectation result,
and where the decision is clearly consistent with other values. (Of
course, in such clear cases it is likely that the decision could be
made without any "test.") Nevertheless, extreme care is required
in applying these doctrinal tests. This article not only warns of
the need for such care' 0 but also indicates the particular limits
of the tests.
2. Theoretical Utility. - Placing normative doctrine within
a broader social framework and evaluating doctrinal proposals in
terms of the formal criteria indicates:
(1) That any efficiency or consumer expectation model will
encounter certain identifiable difficulties of ambiguity and jus-
tification, and
(2) That these difficulties underlie not only issues concerning
UDPD but also many of the classic recurring tort issues, which
are necessarily intractable because they result from the inherent
limits of the basic models.'
Thus, the analysis indicates a number of fundamental "stress
points" at the core of tort doctrine.
An appreciation of these points can play a vital role in evalu-
ating and developing alternative approaches to doctrine. As indi-
cated above, there are three basic nonfault alternatives to cost-
benefit or consumer expectation models for product-caused inju-
ries:
(1) Some synthesis of the two Restatement perspectives on
UDPD, e.g., cost-benefit analysis from the perspective of the
expectations of the reasonable consumer."'
(2) The acceptance of UDPD as relevant and the adoption of
a different perspective from that suggested by the
Restatement. ",2
to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease
itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of
the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of
risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied
by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably danger-
ous.
109. Note the importance of warnings in determining liability for unavoidably unsafe
products pursuant to the portion of Comment k to § 402A of the RESTATErm (SEcoND)
OF TORTS (1965) quoted in note 108 supra.
110. See, e.g., notes 61, 65-66, 71, 74, 96-98 and accompanying text supra; cf., e.g.,
notes 49-52 and accompanying text supra.
111. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
112. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
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(3) The adoption of a framework which rejects both the
Restatement and UDPD as determinative.1
3
A brief evaluation of these three alternatives in terms of the for-
mal criteria of ambiguity and justification indicates stress points
similar to those discovered in the cost-benefit and consumer ex-
pectation models.
The first alternative is arguably an improvement because a
synthesis would more accurately reflect the multidimensional
aspects of the real world than would either an efficiency model
or a consumer expectation model."4 However, this combination
of the two models presents the same problems of ambiguity and
justification as the underlying models.
Proposals which adopt the second or third alternative utilize
a particular structure for deciding products liability cases:"'
(1) A set (G) of policies or goals for law, accident law, tort law,
or product-liability law is identified. It is conceded that the
particular goals (g,, g , .. . , g) within set G may conflict
and/or that G may conflict with other policies or goals, but the
valuation of the relevant goals is omitted because it would
involve substantive determinations of justice.
(2) A doctrine is proposed to indicate UDPD and/or to identify
the proper loss-bearer. This doctrine often consists of a set (D)
of interrelated, potentially conflicting subdoctrines (d,, d2,
•. . ,d ).
(3) A decisionmaker is selected and told to follow D (or d,)
except where it does not maximize for G (or some other
unspecified goal or policy), in which case either d, or d3 or. . . or
d, (or some alternative, unspecified doctrine) should be used.
Underlying such approaches is a cost-benefit perspective on the
"reasonableness"/"rationality"/"goodness" of a decision:
Given two possible decisions, A and B, if B would result in a
greater realization of the goals or policies than A, then officials
ought to adopt B as the decision.
113. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
114. Cf. note 58 supra.
115. See APPENDIX 2 for two specific examples of this formal structure. The
"balancing" approach implicit in the structure in the text, particularly Step 3, is also
typical of proposals in other areas of the law. See, e.g., F. NORTHRUP, T IE COMPLExrrY OF
LEGAL AND ETHIcAL EXPERIENCE 45-48 (1959). For discussions of this model in a judicial
context, see, e.g., R. POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 63-102 (1942); R. UNGER, supra
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Thus, the second and third alternatives present the same prob-
lems as the cost-benefit test of UDPD even though the efficiency
analysis is at another level."'
Because not only cost-benefit and expectation models but
also the three basic alternative models are subject to criticism in
terms of the two formal criteria of ambiguity and justification, a
question arises: Why are such models so common? There are
several possible explanations. First, the social world is complex
and often (appears) contradictory. Entitlement doctrine, there-
fore, merely reflects its social setting when it recognizes the need
to reconcile potentially conflicting policies."7 Second, more pre-
cise formulation of doctrine would result in "too much" rigidity.
Given the limits of language and the difficulties involved in deter-
mining existing conditions and predicting future conditions, flex-
ibility is necessary and desirable."' Third, this flexibility is not
the same as the lack of a rule because the two primary purposes
of rules, the guidance of citizens and officials and the limiting of
governmental abuse,"' are accomplished to the extent that each
of the five models identifies particular criteria to be considered
and thus facilitates:
(a) the process of making decisions;
(b) the process of justifying decisions;
(c) the process of reviewing decisions;
(d) the process of criticizing decisions; and
(e) the process of predicting decisions.
Thus, such frameworks play a central role in assuring formal or
116. For an explicit conversion of a negligence-oriented cost-benefit framework to a
framework for comparison of goals or values, see Learned Hand's decision in United States
v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), afl'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951):
In each [first amendment] case they must ask whether the gravity of the "evil,"
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger.
Id. at 212. For discussion of Learned Hand's cost-benefit formula for negligence, see note
67 supra.
117. See, e.g., Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry
Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Cm. L. Rav. 69 (1975); cf., e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS
24-31 (1970); Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 3, at 1055; Shapo, supra note 46, at 1371-
80. The trust of this position is exemplified in the following statement by Plato concerning
the limits of rules: "A perfect simple principle can never be applied to a state of things
which is the reverse of simple." PLATO, STATESMAN 294C (Jowett trans.). A similar position
is reflected in note 35 supra.
118. See notes 35 & 89 supra.
119. See, e.g., L. FULLER, THE MORATr OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969).
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procedural justice.2 ' Finally, substantive justice involves under-
lying notions and issues that are metaphysical, mysterious, elu-
sive, and/or subjective, and/or involves decisions that are more
properly left to "social/political" decisionmakers. 2'
Although these arguments have clear merit, two points
should be emphasized. First, none of the proposals offered for
dealing with product-related injuries develops a model of "just
institutions" for applying the formal doctrine.'22 All five alterna-
tives are designed at least in part for courts,2 3 yet no model of a
"just court" is ever developed even though such an institution
plays a crucial role in implementing these normative decisional
frameworks. There may be good reasons for this omission. One
could argue, for example, that the present process of judicial
decisionmaking should be accepted without question in order to
simplify analysis, that no theoretical model of a just court is
likely to be adopted, and/or that the development of such a model
presents difficult value choices that are best left to
"social/political" decisionmakers. The point is not that an other-
wise useful doctrinal model is "bad" or useless because it lacks a
model of just institutions; rather, it is imperative that the limita-
tions of such a doctrinal model be recognized when it is applied
in actual decisions."' Second, even if the concept of just institu-
120. Cf., e.g., K. DAvis, DiscRmoNARY JusrIcn (1969); J. LUCAS,THE PRINCIPLES OF
PoLrrics §§ 20, 24-25, 27-28, 30, 54-55 (1966). Procedural justice is discussed in note 33
supra. These frameworks facilitate justification as defined in note 36 supra because they
constitute a rough list of "relevant universal characteristics."
121. See, e.g., G. CALABREsI, THE COSTS OF AccmaNrs 25, 292 (1970); see discussion
by Shapo, supra note 46, at note 94 supra. The problems presented by various notions of
justice are discussed in notes 29-34, 36-39 and accompanying text supra.
This explanation raises a number of fundamental issues concerning the nature of
"values." The position in the text reflects the "modem" view that "values" are not
absolute but rather are a function of the particular individual involved and his culture
(or subculture). See, e.g., L. STRAuss, NAT RAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953); R. UNGER,
KNOWLEDGE AND POLICS 67-102 (1975); R. UNGER, supra note 34, at 76-86; Heller, The
Importance of Normative Decision-Making: The Limitations of Legal Economics as a
Basis for a Liberal Jurisprudence - As Illustrated by the Regulation of Vacation Home
Development, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 385, 468-85. In contrast to the position stated in these
texts is the "classical" perspective that absolute values do exist and can be discovered by
man. See, e.g., L. STRAuss, supra, at 81-164; R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLrIcs supra;
R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN Sociary, supra.
122. For an example of such a model, see J. RAWLS, supra note 29, at §§ 31-59. For a
discussion of the problems involved in developing such a framework, see notes 33-34 supra
and authorities cited in note 138 infra.
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tions were developed, the crucial role of substantive justice would
remain: entitlement decisions are made and these decisions in-
volve the evaluation of conflicting goals, the determination of
what constitutes "too much" rigidity, and the exercise of discre-
tion that can be abused and that renders decisions unpredictable.
Thus, despite their substantial strengths and despite their justifi-
able omission of certain concerns, the existing models are none-
theless incomplete as guides for "proper" decisionmaking in that
they lack models of just institutions and of substantive justice.
B. The Limits of the Framework and Analysis
A framework has been sketched which can be used to view
doctrine from a social perspective and to analyze proposals con-
cerning "proper" doctrine in terms of two formal criteria. Specific
doctrinal solutions to the problems raised by the framework were
neither promised nor offered."2 5 Similarly, substantive criteria for
evaluating "ought"-oriented doctrine were not developed.' 8 The
framework is thus subject to the same criticisms that were ad-
dressed to proposals concerning the "proper" approach to
(product-caused) injuries.'27 It is incomplete because it omits sub-
stantive proposals for resolving the underlying issues of substan-
tive justice.
IV. CONCLUSION: BEYOND FORMAL, ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS TO
METAPHYSICS AND SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE
Having concluded that formal frameworks have particular
strengths and weaknesses, it is necessary to consider two basic
questions concerning the weaknesses: Can we go beyond con-
structing formal doctrinal frameworks for analyzing (product)
injury cases and beyond constructing formal jurisprudential
frameworks for analyzing doctrinal frameworks? If so, how do we
proceed? Answering such ultimate questions is difficult, if not
impossible, at present. Nevertheless, several points seem highly
relevant.
First, entitlement doctrines (whether viewed in terms of be-
havior, rules, or proper decisions),' including UDPD proposals,
125. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
126. See notes 38-39 and accompanying text supra.
127. See text following note 122 supra.
128. See notes 27-34 and accompanying text supra.
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inevitably involve decisions concerning the "worthiness" of per-
sons and conduct. Such decisions raise questions of substantive
justice which involve metaphysical issues concerning life, pur-
pose, and the relationships of people (past, present, and future) 2 '
to one another.'30 The official resolution of these various related
issues necessarily results in the imposition of a particular view of
what society "ought" to do. At this point, value relativism ends.
Second, since there are no fully adequate answers to these
metaphysical questions,'"' there can likewise be no completely
adequate answer to the question of what doctrine ought to be.
Third, despite these uncertainties, entitlement (and, there-
fore, substantive justice and metaphysical) decisions must be
made.32
Fourth, since UDPD decisions must be made and since these
decisions involve substantive justice/metaphysical issues that
lack (clear) answers, a decisionmaker has two alternatives - to
ignore these difficult questions or to address them explicitly. It
is my assertion that the latter alternative should be adopted
because UDPD decisions should be "ought"-oriented and should
be made on the basis of an explicit consideration of the basic
underlying issues.'3 Doctrinal frameworks, whether couched in
terms of cost-benefit, reasonable consumer expectations, or some
alternative perspective, can assist and guide this consideration
but they cannot supplant it.
Fifth, to the extent that "officials" try to conform definitions
of UDPD to norms of proper decisionmaking, actual decisions can
be used as a rough reflection of what UDPD "ought" to be, partic-
ularly where these "officials" attempt to justify their decision
both in terms of formal justice and in terms of substantive justice
or metaphysics.
Finally, although the exact content of metaphysical consid-
erations will vary, such substantive models are likely to resemble,
at least in form, "religious" proposals such as:134
129. See text accompanying note 66 supra; see note 67 supra.
130. See notes 14-15, 29-34, 67-69, 99-102 and accompanying text supra and text
following note 122 supra. See generally, e.g., R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY (1976).
131. Cf. notes 38-39 and accompanying text supra.
132. See note 29 supra.
133. See note 120 and accompanying text supra.
134. Cf., e.g., P. TEUACH, LOVE, POWER, AND JUSTICE (1954); R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE
AND POLITICS 290-96 (1975).
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In as much as ye had done it unto one of the least of these
my brethren, ye have done it unto me."' (I.e., decide cases/make




Such metaphysical proposals will sound unfamiliar (and perhaps
inappropriate) 37 to some. Moreover, like all "ought"-oriented
135. Matthew 25:40 (King James). There are interesting parallels in the perspective
on justice and law between this article and the New Testament. For example, Jesus asserts
that the "law" (sacred rules in the Old Testament) is based on a particular conception of
"social justice":
But when the Pharisees heard that he had silenced the Sad'ducees, they
came together. And one of them, a lawyer, asked him a question, to test him.
"Teacher, which is the great commandment in the law?" And he said to him,
"You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul,
and with all your mind. This is the great and first commandment. And a second
is like it, You shall love your neighbor as yourself. On these two commandments
depend all the law and the prophets."
Matthew 22:34-40 (Revised Standard 1962) (emphasis added). Since the Second Com-
mandment presents a formal model of justice, Jesus is forced to offer parables that provide
substantive content. See, e.g., Luke 10:25-37 (concept of "neighbor" in Second Command-
ment illustrated through the use of the parable of "the good Samaritan"); Matthew 25:40
(quoted in text above).
136. Cf. J. RAWLS, supra note 29. The general concept underlying the Rawlsian ap-
proach to justice is that:
All social primary goods-liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the
bases of self-respect-are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribu-
tion of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored.
Id. at 303. This approach has been suggested as relevant not only to entitlement analysis
generally, see, e.g., Michelman, supra note 8, at 1165 (1967), but also to products liability
assessments. E.g., Shapo, supra note 46, at 1383-86. The parallels of Rawls' system to
Christian views has been noted by others. E.g., Merritt, Justice of Fairness: A Commen-
tary on Rawls' New Theory of Justice, 26 VAND. L. REv. 665, 686 (1973).
137. Such statements would appear to offend both political and religious concerns for
separating "officials" from religion. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I; J. YODER, THE POL-
TICS OF JESUS (1972). The following quotation from Martin Luther's SECULAR AuTHoRrrY:
To WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE OBEYED, PE, 111, 237, reflects one view concerning the
inappropriateness of using the Bible as a basis for political decisions:
A man who would venture to govern an entire community, or the world, with
the Gospel would be like a shepherd who should place in one fold wolves, lions,
eagles, and sheep together and say, "Help yourselves, and be good and peaceful
among yourselves; the fold is open, there is plenty of food; have no fear of dogs
or clubs." The sheep, forsooth, would keep the peace and would allow them-
selves to be fed and governed in peace, but they would not live long.
Quoted in Forrester, Martin Luther and John Calvin, in HISTORY OF PoLrrMAL PHMosoPH
at 301 (L. Strauss & J. Cropsey eds.) (2d ed. 1963).
Since not all people hold absolute views on the appropriateness of this separation,
see, e.g., YODER, supra, at 15-23, appraisals of "appropriateness" may vary according to
the type of "official" involved. For example, the same person might approve such state-
ments when made by democratically elected legislators but not when made by non-elected
judges. Such a response requires some "justification" for distinguishing between judges
and legislators since both make distributive decisions in our society. See note 72 supra.
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doctrines, they should be subjected to critical analysis,'38 and it
would not be surprising if such analysis indicated that these par-
ticular proposals are fatally insufficient as guides for officials
such as American judges. But present proposals, such as tests for
identifying UDPD, concerning the proper allocation and enforce-
ment of entitlements will not be complete until the importance
and role of the ultimate questions are recognized and explicitly
addressed. Thus, in order to escape formal frameworks which
involve the balancing of conflicting values, it is necessary to re-
turn not merely to considerations of natural law but ultimately
to questions of divine law. Until this inquiry is undertaken we
shall suffer the centuries-old curse of the Prophet Amos:
Behold, the days come, saith the Lord God, that I will send a
famine in the land, not a famine of bread, nor a thirst for water,
but of hearing the words of the Lord.1"'
138. For criticism of the Rawlsian framework (discussed in note 136, supra) see, e.g.,
B. BARRY, THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTInCE (1973); READING RAwLs (N. Daniels ed. 1974).
A discussion of some of the problems of utilizing the Rawlsian framework as a guide to
decisionmaking by American judges is contained in Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitu-
tional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. Rav. 962 (1973).
For a summary of the limits of the New Testament framework, discussed in note 135
supra, as the basis for "ought.oriented" doctrine, see, e.g., J. YODER, THE PoLrrIcs OF JEsus
15-23, 244-50 (1972).
139. Amos 8:11, (King James). A more recent version of this predicament in modem
times is found in the last sentence of R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLIrIcs 295 (1975): "But
our days pass, and still we do not know you fully. Why then do you remain silent? Speak,
God."A similar concern with the importance of a concept of God in providing a foundation
for "scientific" analysis is developed in C. CHURCHMAN, THE DESIGN OF INQUIRING SYSTEMS:
BASIC CONCEptS OF SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATION (1971).
[Vol. 28
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APPENDIX 1
APPROACHES TO COMPENSATION PRIOR TO
BORDER CROSSING
An appreciation of the various methods of compensating
prior to border crossings requires the development of sub-






CROSSING uncertain 01 001 00
1 00 2
FOUR CASES OF BOUNDARY CROSSINGS
The following examples illustrate each of the four cases :14
Case 11: A shoots B with a gun known to be loaded and
functional; X sells Y a product that is defective
and that will injure Y because of such defect.
Case 01: A places one bullet in a gun, spins the chamber,
aims the gun at B's head, and pulls the trigger;
X sells Y a product from a group of which a
given percentage of a given number of the prod-
ucts contain a defect which causes injury.
Case 10: A fires a gun known to be loaded and functional
,into a crowd at random; X sells each member of
a group of persons a product and at least one of
the products sold to the group contains a defect
which will cause injury.
140. See note 141, infra.
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Case 00: A places one bullet in a gun, spins the chamber,
aims the gun at a crowd, and pulls the trigger;
X sells each member of group of persons a
product and there is a chance that at least one
of the products sold to the group contains a de-
fect which will cause injury.
Certainty in the table refers to statistical "certainty" within
some small parameters of accuracy. For example, if, given such
parameters, there is a statistical likelihood that one out of
1,000 borders will be crossed and a sufficient number of bor-
ders are potentially involved, then there is a statistical certainty
that a border will be crossed.' 41 Since uncertainty in this case
exists only as to which person's border will be crossed, case 10
is involved. If there were only ten people involved, then case 00
would be involved because there would be no statistical cer-
tainty that a border would be crossed. However, since case 00
would also be involved if no probability statements could be
made, case 00 has two subsets:
00 :Situations where probability of person/crossing
both less than 1.
00 : Situations where no probability statements can be
made.
Precrossing compensation is possible in 001 but not in 002 be-
cause the latter lacks the requisite probability statements.
141. The exact number depends upon whether the events are independent, and if so,
the parameters of accuracy that are used. If the 1,000 events are not independent, then
the likelihood of the event increases with each nonoccurence. For example, in a gun with
1000 chambers and one bullet randomly placed in'one chamber, the probability of the gun
firing (the event) the first time the trigger is pulled is 1/1000. If it does not fire the first
time, the probability is 1/999, and so on until, if it has not fired in the first 999 trials,
then the probability of the last firing is 1/1. However, if the events are independent, then
the probability of each trial considered separately is the same. If the gun chamber in the
above example is spun randomly after each pulling of the trigger, the probability (p) of
the gun firing each time is 1/1000. Yet even with independent events, the probability of a
firing in a sufficient number of trigger pullings considered as a whole approaches certainty.
More specifically, if the independent trigger-pullings are considered together, the proba-
bility of a firing within any number of firings (n) is [ - (1-p) nj = [1 - (.999)n1. See, e.g.,
S. LIPscHutrz, FINIrs MATHEMATICS 217 (1966); E. PARZEN, MODERN PROBABILITY THEORY
AND ITS APPLICATIONS 179 (1960). Consequently, the probability of the gun firing the first
time is .001, the second time is .00199, and thousandth time is .63. The probability is .95
on the 2994th, .99 on the 4602nd, and .999 on the 6904th. (The author would like to express
his appreciation to David King of the University of South Carolina Department of Sociol-
ogy for his assistance in writing this footnote.)
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Based on this subeategorization, the approach to precross-
ing compensation would vary according to which of the four
cases is involved:
11 Compensation given to person whose border is to
be crossed.
14 2
01 Compensation is paid as a lump sum to the person
threatened but the amount is discounted by the
probability of its occurrence.' 43
10 Compensation given on a pro rata basis to each
person in the class of people threatened,'4 4 or set
aside in a pool prior to crossings to pay for actual
crossings.
1 40
001 Compensation is given on a discounted, pro rata
basis to each person in the class of people threat-
ened, 40 or set aside in a pool to pay them for
crossings.'
4 7
142. An example of this proposition is liquidated damages paid for a continuing
nuisance. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
143. For example, the amount of an eminent domain award often reflects the diminu-
tion in value resulting from the risk imposed by the condemnor's use of the property. See,
e.g., Heddin v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Co., 522 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. 1975) (condemnation award
should reflect risk that pipeline carrying deadly gas would leak). Similarly, the reduced
price of "risky" products vis-i-vis "safe" products often reflects such compensation. There
is no insurance aspect to case 01 because there is no spreading and no full payment if the
injury actually occurs. Thus, preborder-crossing compensation in 01 differs from the insur-
ance schemes suggested for cases 10 and 00, in notes 145 & 147 infra. See note 144 infra.
144. Examples here would include situations like those in note 143 supra. However,
with case 10 a class of condemnees or purchasers is involved, and there is a statistical
certainty that at least one member of the class will be injured.
145. Such an approach is used in schemes requiring third-party insurance for those
engaged in the activity. Where numerous actors - for example, automobile drivers - or
numerous products - for example, automobiles - are involved, the class of ac-
tors/products can be treated as a unit. It is often statistically certain that some members
of this unit will be involved in border crossings even though no particular member of the
class is certain to be so involved.
146. An example here would parallel the situation in note 144 supra, but with case
00, there is no statistical certainty of a crossing.
147. An example of such an approach is compulsory third-party insurance for those
engaged in the activity.
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APPENDIX 2
FORMAL STRUCTURE OF PROPOSALS
FOR DECIDING PRODUCT LIABILITY CASES
This appendix supports and illustrates the textual assertion
that proposals for allocating liability for product-"caused" in-
juries follow a particular pattern by briefly examining two such
proposals. 148 The tests are presented in symbolic form and it
is assumed that the reader has some prior knowledge of the
particular proposals.
It should be kept in mind that the analysis does not (and
is not intended to) show that these models are "bad."149 Instead,
it merely indicates the existence and nature of the limits of
these models so that they can be used with a greater appre-
ciation of their limits.
A. The Calabresi/Hirsohoff Test
Building on the framework for accident analysis developed
by Calabresi in the Costs of Accidents,' 1 Guido Calabresi and
Jon Hirschoff propose the following efficiency test for (strict)
liability :151
(1) Goals (G)
ii) G = t justice (g, ), cost reduction (g2 ) ._
(ii) go I primary cost reduction (g2 l ), secondary
cst reduction (g22), tertiary cost reduction
(g2 3 ) 1-
'.53
(iii) interdependence and potential conflict (t I = in-
terdependent and potentially conflicting) 15
1) g1 N U
2) 2 1 tj g22tIg23
148. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
149. See notes 117-23 and accompanying text supra.
150. G. CALABRESI, THE CosTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970) [hereinafter CosT].
151. Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055 (1972) [hereinafter Strict Liability].
152. CosTs at 24-31.
153. In Strict Liability g22 is referred to as a distributional consideration (id. at
1077-78) rather than as the reduction of secondary costs as in CosTS at 27-28, 39-67.
154. CosTs at 29.
[Vol. 28634
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(2) Doctrine (D)(i).'D -- Idl, d2, d3}
(ii) 1) d.l= maximize g2 1 (and g2 ' by placing
liability on person best able to accomplish
92 1 .
2) d2  - maximize 922-
31 d3  maximize gl .
(iii) dl t d2 t I d
(3) Instructions to Court
(i) used 1 1
(ii) exceptions to use of dl
1) use d 2 if
155. Strict Liability at 1060-61. The explicit assertion that g9 ,(reduction of primary
costs) and the implicit assertion that g2 (reduction of tertiary costs) is always maximized
by this approach reflect a number of underlying factual assumptions:
(1) either that the private party (or class of parties) subjected to liability can
usually (or always) make the evaluation more cheaply than a court or that a
significant amount of such nonjudicial evaluation would occur anyway - i.e.,
private g., < judicial g23
OR
private g , < (judicial g23 + private g,, occurring anyway)
(2) that the cost of such nonjudicial evaluation is (generally) less than the
resulting savings in primary costs (g22) - i.e.,
g, > private g, 3
(3) -that the primary cost reduction (g2,) resulting from the nonjudicial
evaluation is such that:
(a) it usually (or always) exceeds such savings by judicial evaluation,
see, e.g., Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656,
669-70 (1975) - i.e.,
private g , > judicial g2,
AND/OR
(b) the ratio of primary cost reduction (g9,) resulting from nonjudicial
evaluation to the tertiary costs of such evaluation (g,) always (or usually)
exceeds the corresponding ratio of cost reduction resulting from judicial
evaluation to judicial evaluation costs - i.e.,
private (g,,: g,,) > judicial(g., : g,).
See note 62 and accompanying text supra. The first two assumptions are questionable
since the Calabresi/Hirschoff approach requires that the court determine not only who can
most cheaply assess the costs and benefits but also who can best implement actions which
reduce primary costs. Strict Liability at 1060, n. 19. See CosTs at 135. Moreover, the
choice of the particular doctrine (d, d, or d,) covered involves considerable tertiary costs.
See notes 159-61 and accompanying text infra.
156. CosTS at 25-26. See also id. at 31-33.
157. This follows from gt Ig-, g,, i g2 "
158. Strict Liability at 1060-61.
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i) plaintiff and defendant are equal in respect
to maximizing g2  (and 92  ) or
92 2 . 6 f1 3
2) use d3ifg2 <g1 "'
The crucial omissions from this model occur at two points.
First, in the instructions to the court there is no guidance on
the comparative evaluation of g2 1 versus 922, and g_ versus
g2 . Second, the person made liable under dl or d2 is given no
guidance on how as assess g2 1 . For example, if the manufac-
turer of a product is held liable under d, , he will be faced with
the ambiguities in the efficiency model discussed in the text ;112
yet, because no resolution of these problems is presented, his
decision may not be "efficient."
B. The Shapo Model
Marshall Shapo presents a consumer expectation model for
determining liability:"'
(1) Goals (G).1 (i) G={1g, , g2,g3, g4 Yg95 g6,7,gs 'S 16
159. Id. at 1083-84.
160. Coss at 39-67. See Strict Liability at 1076-84. CosTs and Strict Liability vary
here somewhat because CosTs leaves the identity of the decisionmaker - e.g., court,
legislature, or administrative agency - open while Strict Liability is addressed to a
particular institution - courts. Strict Liability, therefore, involves questions concerning
the "proper" and actual decision processes of courts. Although the consideration of these
issues is not developed in great detail, Strict Liability appears to conclude: (1) that,
whatever one's view of the proper role of courts, distributional considerations are involved;
(2) that the adoption of d, depends in part on one's view of the extent to which these
considerations are involved; and (3) that the cases suggest that courts in fact'follow a
pattern like that in the text - i.e., follow d, if either exception exists.
161. CosTS at 25-26.
162. See text accompanying notes 58-77 supra.
163. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function
and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109 (1974) [hereinafter
Shapo].
164. See id. at 1371-88. The subscripted numbers parallel the numbers used by Shapo
in his eight subject headings:
(1) Incentive for the Production of Useful Goods,
(2) Accident Prevention,
(3) Loss Distribution,
(4) Division of Lawmaking Functions,
(5) Economic Stability,
(6) Controlling the Abuse of Power,
(7) Justice, and
(8) Respect for Law.
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1977] UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS PRODUCT DEFECT
(ii) g91N g2t['' .g .8':
(2) Doctrine (D).
(i) D={d1 , d 2 ,. ..d13167
(iii) d1= Idy1, d1.2 Id3 y431 d 2 1',d5 dt51,
d5 2 , d6  = Id6 1 , d62 , d12 =Id1 21 , d1 2 2 ,d,3 =td131,d13 "".
The elements of G seem to overlap in many instances. For example, abuse of power (g9)
appears to be defined, at least in part, by reference to "proper" use of power, and "proper
use" is defined by reference to other goals - e.g., g, and g,.
165. See id. The potential for conflict clearly exists, for example, between g2 (acci-
dent prevention) and g, (justice/fairness). To the extent that goals overlap, see note 164
supra, conflict is reduced.
166. The reference is to the 13 factors listed in Shapo at 1370-71 and the subscripted
numbers correspond to his numbers:
Considerations relevant to decision making on the basis of this model would
include:
1. The nature of the product as a vehicle for creation of persuasive adver-
tising images, and the relationship of this factor to the ability of sellers to
generate product representations in mass media;
2. The specificity of representations and other communications related to
the product;
3. The intelligence and knowledge of consumers generally and of the dis-
appointed consumer in particular;
4. The use of sales appeals based on specific consumer characteristics;
5. The consumer's actions during his encounter with the product, evalu-
ated in the context of his general knowledge and intelligence and of his actual
knowledge about the product or that which reasonably could be ascribed to him;
6. The implications of the proposed decision for public health and safety
generally, and especially for social programs that provide coverage for accidental
injury and personal disability;
7. The incentives that the proposed decision would provide to make the
product safer;
8. The cost to the producer and other sellers of acquiring the relevant
information about the crucial product characteristic and the cost of supplying
it to persons in the position of the disappointed party;
9. The availability of the relevant information about the crucial product
characteristic to persons in the position of the disappointed party and the cost
to them of acquiring it;
10. The effects of the proposed decision on the availability of data that
bear on consumer choice of goods and services;
11. Generally, the likely effects on prices and quantities of goods sold;
12. The costs and benefits attendant to determination of the legal issues
involved, either by private litigation or by collective social judgment;
13. The effects of the proposed decision on wealth distribution, both be-
tween sellers and consumers and among sellers.
167. This interrelation and potential conflict exist because emphasizing one factor -
e.g., g, - can often result in a de-emphasis of another - e.g., g,,.
168. Shapo at 1370-71. The subscripted numbers (1, 3, 5, 6, 12, 13) parallel the
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iv) d11 t d12 ,d 3  t d3 2 ,d5 1 tI d5 2 , d6l d62 ,
4121), I d122 , d181t I d132 16"9
(3) In4structions. Consider D and determine liability.7 "
It can be argued that D maximizes G better than any alter-
native doctrine171 and that better decisions are likely where
relevant factors are considered pursuant to D.172 However,
given the potential conflict within D and G, this argument
relies upon judicial discretion, applied in case-by-case manner,
to produce "proper" entitlement decisions. 173 Moreover, because
of the conflicts within D and within G, Shapo's approach pro-
vides limited guidance in the exercise of this discretion.
174
numbers which Shapo uses to identify the "considerations relevant to decision making."
Id. at 1370. Those considerations are quoted in note 167 supra.
169. An example of such internal conflict in d, is discussed in note 94 supra.
170. Shapo at 1370-71.
171. Id. at 1371-88.
172. See note 120 and accompanying text supra.
173. See note 94 supra.
174. See text following note 122 supra.
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